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ABSTRACT
This case study on East Africa analyses the impact of changing power relations over the last 
decade on Egypt’s hydro-hegemony on the Nile River Basin. Covering one-tenth of Africa’s 
landmass and providing resources for the 340 million people and countless species, the Nile is 
exemplary of Africa’s geographic, cultural and ecological diversity, as well as its political 
complexity. Eleven riparian states lie in its basin area and compete for dwindling water 
resources as demand rises in a highly asymmetrical power relationship between upstream and 
downstream states. 
Egypt, although geographically disadvantaged due to its downstream position, has established 
hydro-hegemony by combining material capabilities, legal and institutional mechanisms, as 
well as knowledge production. Its relative wealth is contingent upon the supply of Nile water, 
as it makes up 95% of Egypt’s freshwater. Egypt has legally secured its claim through the 
1959 Treaty on the Full Utilisation of the Nile Waters which divides the Nile water flow 
between Egypt and Sudan. Egypt further established consolidated control by using its 
downstream position in the World Bank to de facto veto upstream hydro-electric power 
projects throughout the 1990s.
In contrast, the East African Community Partner States only started to lay claim to the water 
over the last decade due to its history of colonialism, proxy wars and political instability. In 
2002, the EAC decided to manage the Lake Victoria Basin jointly. Paired with growing 
stability and economic growth in the region, this management has attracted Chinese 
investment in hydro-electric power projects, notably dams, giving East Africa financial 
independence from both the World Bank and Egypt to build hydro-infrastructure projects. 
East African states use the influx of Chinese investments to increase their respective defence 
budgets while Egypt’s military spending, as a share of GDP, has been decreasing over the last 
decade. Under the Nyerere Doctrine, East African states refuse to honour the 1959 Treaty and 
have asked for re-negotiation. The first step was taken in 2011, when six upstream states 
under EAC leadership signed the Cooperative Framework Agreement paving the way for re-
negotiation, in the face of Egypt’s explicit refusal.
Domestic factors in Egypt, coupled with East Africa’s growing self-confidence, are slowly 
changing the power relations in the Nile basin. Using the London Water Research Group’s 
Hydro-Hegemony framework in a triangular diachronic single-case study research design, this 
study traces the processes of counter-hegemony and hydropolitical power shifts. 
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Understanding these political processes is the first step towards the sustainable distribution of 
the Nile water resources on the basin level.
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vOPSOMMING
Hierdie gevallestudie oor Oos-Afrika ontleed die impak van veranderende magsverhoudinge 
op Egipte se beheer oor die loop van die Nylwater gedurende die laaste dekade.
Die Nyl, wat vloei oor een tiende van die landmassa van Afrika en lewensmiddele verskaf aan 
die 340 miljoen mense en ontelbare spesies wat daar ´n bestaan voer, dien as voorbeeld vir
Afrika se geografiese, kulturele en ekologiese diversiteit sowel as die politieke kompleksiteit 
daarvan.  Elf oewerstate lê in die Nylopvanggebied en wedywer vir waterbronne wat afneem, 
terwyl die aanvraag styg in ‘n hoogs asimmetriese magsverhouding tussen die lande wat 
stroomop en stroomaf geleë is. 
Alhoewel Egipte geografies benadeel is deur stroomaf geleë te wees, het die land 
hidrohegemonie verkry deur middel van sy materiële vermoëns, wets- en institutêre 
meganismes, en kennisproduksie. Die relatiewe rykdom van Egipte is afhanklik van die 
beskikbaarheid van Nylwater, wat 95% van die land se varswater verskaf. Egipte het sy 
aanspraak daarop wetlik vasgelê deur middel van die 1959 Verdrag oor die Volle Gebruik van 
die Nylwater, wat die Nyl se vloei verdeel tussen Egipte en die Soedan.   Gedurende die 1990s 
het die land sy beheer verder versterk deur sy stroomafposisie by die Wêreldbank te gebruik 
om hidroelktriesekragprojekte stroomop de facto te veto.
As gevolg van ‘n geskiedenis van kolonialisme en politieke onrus, het die lidstate van die 
Oos-Afrikaanse Gemeenskap (OAG) egter eers gedurende die laaste dekade begin om die 
Nylwater te eis.  In 2002 het die OAG besluit om die Victoriameer-opvanggebied gesamentlik 
te beheer.  Hierdie beheer, saam met toenemende bestendigheid en ekonomiese groei in die 
gebied, het aanleiding gegee tot Chinese beleggings in hidroelektriesekragprojekte, veral 
damme, sodat Oos-Afrika finansiële onafhanklikheid verkry het van beide die Wêreldbank en 
Egipte om sy eie hidro-infrastuktuurprojekte te bou. Terwyl die Oos-Afrikaanse lande die 
invloei van Chinese beleggings gebruik om hulle onderskeie verdedigingsbegrotings te 
vergroot, het Egipte se militêre uitgawes afgeneem as ‘n deel van die BBP oor die laaste 
dekade.  Die Oos-Afrikaanse lande beroep hulle op die Nyerere Dokrine deur te weier om die 
1959 Verdrag na te kom, en het versoek dat dit heronderhandel word. Die eerste treë is in 
2011, geneem toe ses stroomoplande onder die leierskap van die OAG die Koöperatiewe 
Raamwerk Verdrag onderteken het, wat die pad voorberei vir heronderhandeling ten spyte 
van Egipte se onomwonde weiering daartoe. 
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Plaaslike faktore in Egipte, saam met Oos-Afrika se groeiende selfvertroue, begin om 
stadigaan die magsverhoudinge in die Nylopvanggebied te verander. Hierdie studie gebruik 
die London Water Research Group se Hidrohegemonieraamwerk om die prosesse van 
kontrahegemonie en hidropolitieke magsverskuiwings na te spoor in ’n driehoekige 
diachroniese enkelgevallestudie navorsingsontwerp.  
Om hierdie politieke prosesse te verstaan is die eerste stap tot die volhoubare verspreiding van 
waterbronne in die opvanggebied van die Nyl.
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1CHAPTER 1: AIM, SCOPE AND METHOD1
1.1 Introduction to Study
The question Who gets how much water and why? (Lasswell, 1935) guides all political 
scientists writing on transboundary waterways in one way or another. The aim of this study is 
to investigate the impacts of the founding of the East African Community (EAC) and 
resulting regional cooperation, on Egypt’s historical hegemonic control of the Nile’s water 
resources. It is argued that the five EAC Partner States: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania 
and Uganda, for the first time since independence in the 1960s, are successfully challenging 
Egypt’s hydro-hegemony and laying claim to the water resources. This means that Egypt’s 
control over the Nile resources is decreasing and it has to invest in new water resource control 
strategies. 
The world’s longest river, the Nile River, is one of Africa’s foremost lifelines, its basin area 
covering a tenth of the continent’s landmass (see Map 1.1, page 3). It stands for the 
continent’s geographic, cultural, and ecological diversity. The Nile River is made up of two 
main tributaries, the Blue and White Nile2, which unite in Sudan’s capital Khartoum from 
where they flow into the Mediterranean Sea at Egypt. The Blue Nile has its upstream3 source 
in northwestern Ethiopia while the White Nile flows out of Lake Victoria in Jinja, Uganda. It 
carries relatively little water4 and with large seasonal variations. Eleven sovereign states lie 
within its basin area (see Map 1.2., page 3), making distribution an intricate political totality. 
Despite being divided by state boundaries, the Nilotic peoples and species are united through 
their co-dependence on the Nile’s water and fishery resources. 
The fact is that water distribution varies significantly between the eleven riparian states. As a 
matter of fact, the “main hydraulic and political features of the basin (...) are the asymmetric 
use of water resources” (Cascao, 2008: 13). Access to the scarce, non-substitutable resource, 
1 Conference presentation arising from this thesis:
Hanke N. July 2012. Crossing Boundaries in the Nile River Basin: The East African Community’s Challenge 
to Hydro-Hegemony. Panel Presentation at the International Water Association’s Young Water Professionals   
Conference, Budapest, Hungary (Chapter 1 and Chapter 3)
2 To a negligible degree the Bahr al Ghazal Basin also contributes to the Nile water flow (Jacobs, 2009:2)
3 Upstream refers to the location close to the source, contributing to the water flow; downstream being away 
from the source (see Table 1.1).
4 In this study “water “only refers to fresh water, i.e. drinking water.
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2water, is determined by politics: “The scarcity at the heart of the global water crisis is rooted 
in power, poverty, and inequality, not in physical availability” (UNDP, 2006: 2). In the case 
of the Nile River Basin (NRB) the asymmetrical power relations are reflected in the 
inequitable water distribution of upstream and downstream riparians. The most downstream 
state, Egypt, has consolidated control over the water flow, although 95% of the water 
originates outside its sovereign territory. 
The colonial legacy, the global political climate, lack of international investment as well as 
few military and economic capabilities, the absence of coherent water policies, a weak and 
unclear international legal framework, and political instability have meant that upstream 
riparians were unable to assert their water interests (Cascao, 2008: 254). In the last ten years, 
upstream riparians have invested material capabilities, built-up regional water management 
institutions, and signed the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), thus sending a signal 
to the downstream states that they are now in a position to challenge the asymmetrical power 
relations in the NRB and claim water. As a result, the NRB is now “characterized by a highly 
politically dynamic environment” (Cascao, 2008: 249). 
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3Map 1.1 and 1.2: The Nile River Basin and the Riparian States (NBI, 2011; Bekheet, 2011)
The eleven riparian states: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and, as of June 2011, the Republic 
South Sudan
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41.2 Problem Statement and Research Question
Sixty-four of the world’s two-hundred and sixty transboundary river basins, i.e. rivers 
crossing internationally recognized state boundaries, are located in Africa (Ashton, 2009). 
This makes the entire freshwater distribution on the continent an international political issue, 
yet uniform institutional or legal policies are in place neither on the international nor the 
continental level. Since populations across the continent are growing and the already scarce 
resource is likely to decline further due to man-made climate change (Scheumann & 
Herrfahrdt-Pähle, 2008: 3), distribution is becoming a continental priority. Water scarcity has 
officially been recognized in 2002 by the continental leaders when the African Ministers’ 
Council on Water (AMCOW) was established, thereby elevating water onto the highest 
political agendas. 
In terms of the utilisation of its water the Nile represents the duality of the water resources 
being simultaneously under-developed (hydroelectricity) and over-exploited (agriculture) 
(UNDP, 2006). The 224 million people living in its basin area depend on the Nile for water. 
Most of the water, that is, around 72%, is used for arguably ineffective irrigation schemes and 
few dams are in place to mitigate flooding and store water for the dry seasons. In addition, the 
Nile’s resources have been and still are highly unevenly distributed across time and space5
(Rangeley et al., 1994: 4). 
Over many decades Egypt, with explicit Sudanese support and implicit international backing, 
has controlled the Nile water flow and thus firmly established hydro-hegemony. “Egypt’s 
strategy to the Nile basin relations has been impressive in its attention to detail and its global 
scope” (Allan, 2000: 258). Through a combination of different strategies in the legal, political,
and economic realm, Egypt has managed to sustain its hegemony and weaken others’ position 
to utilise the vast majority of the water resources. 
Over the last ten years, East Africa’s power has made great strides and the region is now for 
the first time successfully claiming equitable access to the Nile. East Africa’s economic and 
political development can also be traced back to the founding of the EAC in 1999 and 
5Time: In 1916 the Nile water flow was 120km³/year and in 1984 42km³/year, measured in Aswan (Collins, 1990 
cited in Saleh et al., 2008: 7). Additionally, the rainfall varies significantly from season to season. 
Space: Egypt receives 95% of its water from the Nile River but most of that water originates in the Ethiopian 
highlands (Swain, 2008: 204).
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5enlargement in 2007. The five Partner States, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda 
are united by a “common history, language, culture and infrastructure” (Venter & Neuland, 
2007: 45) and economic integration is being fast-tracked (EAC, 2011a). It is a region that is 
transforming itself and thus changing the rules of the game, consequences of which can be felt 
throughout the continent. The change in the power dynamic will have repercussions on the 
basin-wide water distribution since the relevant East African countries are situated at the most 
upstream source of the Nile, the Lake Victoria Basin (LVB) (see Map 1.3, page 11). 
Most hydropolitical research since the 1990s has focused on whether water scarcity will lead 
to conflict or to cooperation (Jacobs, 2006: 2). The Nile, with its low water volume and 
uneven distribution, has been a focal point for political scientists like Ana Cascao, John 
Waterbury, Jeroen Warner, Anthony Turton, and Inga Jacobs. This study moves away from 
the state-centric conflict-related research paradigm and looks at the understudied Nile 
Equatorial Lakes sub-basin, which is located in East Africa, and away from the conflict-
cooperation paradigm to assess the primary research question: What are the impacts of East 
Africa’s change in power on Egypt’s hydropolitical position on the Nile River Basin?
Two supportive research questions derived from the primary research question are:
What is power in this study?
Using Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner’s framework of Hydro-hegemony (2006), this study 
conceptualises hydro-hegemonic power as being based on three dimensions: i) material, ii) 
institutional and iii) ideational. The actor with the greatest power in all three dimensions uses 
a combination of coercive and convincing strategies to control the water flow. The actor that 
has ‘consolidated control’ over the water flow, is the hydro-hegemon. Whether the water 
distribution is equitable or not, depends on the hydro-hegemon.
How can hydro-hegemony be challenged?
Although the hydro-hegemon controls the water flow, the other actors in the basin, are not 
passive. Power is negotiated and relative among all actors. Ana Cascao (2008) identified 
seven counter-strategies which are divided into phases of resistance: firstly, the actor aims at 
identifying the source of the current regime. This is followed by the active phase whereby the 
non-hegemon delegitimizes the hydro-hegemon i.e. undermining the status quo of water 
distribution. Finally, a new regime of water distribution is created.
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61.3 Research Design
The abovementioned research questions are large in scope and depth and require a tight 
methodological framework. This study will use the single-case study research design to 
provide for scientific clarity. The case, or “spatially delimited social unit under consideration” 
(Gerring, 2007: 26), is East Africa. This means observations are collected on one geographic 
unit, hence, single-case study. It is the unit from whence one can draw conclusions for the 
larger population, namely African transboundary river basins. 
Many case studies appear to exist in what Gerring refers to as a “curious methodological 
limbo” (2007: 7). In order to avert this ‘limbo’, this section on research design and 
methodology outlines why a case study research design approach was chosen and how the 
data was collected. Several aspects of a case study research design are addressed in this 
section; and there is a general introduction to the diachronic single-case study as well as a 
discussion of its advantages and disadvantages for this specific study on East African 
hydropolitics.
A single-case study research design allows connecting the micro and macro level of social 
structures and processes (Vaughan, 1992 cited in Neuman, 2006: 41). Specifically river basins 
profit from this research design as each river is part of a larger water system which in its 
largest form exists on a global level. Water systems worldwide are interconnected and have to 
be understood as whole, not divided parts. From ponds to glaciers, ground water, oceans and 
in form of clouds there is one global system which supplies the most basic resource for life; 
water. It is important to keep this interdependence in mind even when focusing on a specific 
water system. A case study allows for a highly contextualised understanding of East Africa 
with an eye on the global and local level and the generalisation of the findings to other 
African river basins. 
However, generalisation also decreases the external validity which is the “ability to generalize 
findings beyond a specific study” (Neuman, 2006: 264), i.e. the strength between the case and 
population. Considering that this is a single case with few observations, this study cannot 
claim strong external validity of propositional scope. That being said, the NRB is considered 
to be typical of the asymmetrical water distribution that often occurs in transboundary river 
basins. There are altogether eighty transboundary river basins in Africa which share some 
common characteristics. These are among others, high levels of poverty and rapid population 
growth, a lack of international and regional resource governance policy harmonisation (a 
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7notable exception is the Orange River basin, see Turton & Funke, 2008; Jacobs, 2009), as 
well as a shared history of colonialism and proxy wars which shape international and 
domestic politics until today. As a result of these commonalities, the East African case allows 
for some generalisation to the other 79 transboundary river basins as long as the specific 
context of each is kept in mind. 
The ongoing debate in International Relations (IR) between positivists, who continue to see 
the state as the central actor in international relations, and post-positivists, who deem local, 
regional and global actors as equals to the state construct, also trickles down to this study. 
Although Zeitoun and Warner (2006), Zeitoun and Allan (2008) and Cascao (2008, 2009), 
who use the Hydro-hegemony framework, belong to the positivist school of thought, this 
study adapts the Hydro-hegemony framework to incorporate the regional level of analysis. 
East Africa, as will be shown below, warrants a regional analysis of changing power 
dynamics.
1.4 Purpose and Significance of the Study
Power, material, institutional and ideational, as well as the reasons and dynamics of change in 
power relations, forms the basis of political science. “The central interest of studying power 
relations [is] (...) an interest in the (attempted or successful) securing of people’s compliance 
by overcoming or averting their opposition” (Lukes, 1974: 31). What happens to the hegemon 
when this compliance is no longer given? The primary focus of this study is East Africa’s 
growing power and the impact East Africa’s increasing power has on Egypt’s control over the 
transboundary Nile water flow. Yet findings could contribute to understanding the larger 
picture of power relations in African river basins where newly independent countries are 
finding their feet in regional groupings and challenge the status quo. The central interest of 
studying power relations is thus to determine how counter-strategies emerge how new 
regimes are negotiated. 
At a higher level of abstraction, therefore, this study aims at generating a hypothesis on 
regional hydropolitics in the NRB by looking at East Africa. By making the region the central 
unit of analysis and integrating it into the current literature on power asymmetries in river 
basins, it is hoped a well-rounded theoretical lens is created, to analyse the NRB and thereby 
contribute to the growing discussion on the consequences of power asymmetries in river 
basins, on which there is still a considerable scope for more research (Zeitoun & Warner, 
2006: 454).
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8The significance of the study arises from its three objectives:
to describe the sources and strategies of power that Egypt, the hydro-hegemon, has utilised 
and how East Africa is in the process of changing the power relation;
to analyse, in depth, how this is challenging Egypt’s hydro-hegemony on the NRB;
and to enhance our understanding of water-sharing dynamics in the Nile.
Water is life and East Africa is navigating the waves of power before it runs dry. The 
changing power relationships between upstream and downstream riparians, be they states or 
regions, determines who gets the water. As rapid population growth, large-scale irrigation 
projects, hydro-electric power (HEP) plants, the unpredictable consequences of climate 
change and declining water quality come together, the distribution of freshwater is a political, 
economic and basic survival priority area. In his book on the Owen Falls community in 
California and the members’ protests on the privatisation of water, Walton wrote that he tried 
“to tell big story through the lens of a small case” (1992). I hope that, by the end of the 
dissertation, the readers feel that they have understood both the smaller and the larger picture.
The larger picture and real life application was subject of discussion at a talk on “Breaking 
down the Ivory Tower of Academia”. Publishers, journalists, and academics stressed the 
importance of research linkages to the ‘real world’. There are few fields as ‘real world’ as 
studying hydropolitics. The distribution and control of the Nile is essential to agriculture, 
fishing, and underground water systems which are all interlinked. Therefore, any analysis on 
‘who gets the water in the future and why?’ is highly relevant in a ‘real life’ context.
In addition to its interest for policy-makers, this study might hold some interest for students of 
hydropolitics since it is twofold, consisting of both the theoretical framework and the NRB as 
a case study. Conceptually, the contribution that critical approaches can make to hydro-
hegemony is being explored here. Such an exploration might be an encouragement to other 
students to critically engage mainstream theories. The current study, in fact, was inspired by 
Dr. Inga Jacobs, herself a student of hydropolitics at the University of Stellenbosch.
1.5 Motivation for Selection of East Africa
The primary reason for choosing East Africa lies in the shared water governance and 
development of the LVB’s resources under the auspices of the Lake Victoria Basin 
Commission (LVBC). 2003 marks the year in which the EAC partner States agreed to 
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9“cooperate in relation to Lake Victoria Basin in a co-ordinated and sustainable manner and 
that the Partner States have agreed to negotiate as a bloc on issues relating to the basin” (EAC 
Protocol of Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria, Preamble).
The EAC founding states, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, have previous experience in 
coordinating their resources, through the Lake Victoria Environmental Project (LVEMP) and 
the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO) both of which were founded in 1994 to 
control the water hyacinth levels and keep overfishing in check, respectively. The LVBC 
describes itself as 
A specialized institution of the East African Community that is responsible for 
coordinating the sustainable development agenda of the Lake Victoria Basin. The 
establishment of the Commission has been sequential and bas[es] itself on study 
outputs and step-wise building of the institution. First the Partner States, in the 
first EAC Development Strategy (1997-2000), designated the Lake Victoria and 
its basin as an economic growth zone to be exploited in a coordinated manner. 
(LVBC, 2012)
This regional economic growth zone is in line with the World Bank’s policy to fund economic 
development projects on a sub-basin level as the circumstances vary within the Nile’ highly 
complex hydrological river basin. The World Bank has therefore divided the Nile and its 
numerous tributaries into two sub-basins: first, the Eastern Nile (ENSB) which is equivalent 
to the Blue Nile and originates in the Ethiopian highlands and second, the Equatorial Lakes 
sub-basins (NELSB) which incorporate the East African Great Lakes region (Cascao, 2009: 
10). The ENSB is the only sub-basin that has a regional water resource governance body. 
Their coordination has enabled the EAC Partner States to utilise previously unused Nile 
waters, to influence the frameworks of international law and knowledge production, and to 
increase the bargaining power of the EAC Partner States. Although the East African states do 
not enter Nile negotiations as a communal block, the Partner States jointly enter negotiations,
having previously decided on aims and thus increasing their bargaining power by acting as a 
community, not individual states. 
It is precisely its common governance of the shared water resources that enables East Africa 
to lend itself to a case study of changing power relations along the Nile. This regional 
cooperation has led to the building of new multi-states dams which sit between countries and 
feed electricity into several countries’ grids. To show that East Africa has come a long way 
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from being a conflict-ridden region and has progressed to pioneering multi-state solutions to 
underdevelopment, one might cite the Embassy of Rwanda in Sweden’s tweet® from the 
2012 World Water Week in Stockholm: “Rusumo waterfalls Hydro electric power project 
[was] cited a lot at #WWWEEK [World Water Week] in Stockholm as model for multi-state 
projects in the Nile basin” (RwandaEmbassy Sweden, 2012). 
The above discussion highlights the fact that the EAC is currently the only regional 
organisation in the world to challenge a hydro-hegemon. Ethiopia, by contrast, contributes 
85% to the total water flow at Egypt, compared to East Africa’s mere 15%, but acts 
unilaterally (Cascao, 2009: 253). This makes East Africa a key in the hydropolitical situation 
on the NRB.
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Maps 1.3 and 1.4: East African Community (EAC) Partner States and the Lake Victoria Basin (The Economist, 2009; 
EAC, 2011a)
Partner States: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda
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1.6 Methodology
Founded on the aforementioned purpose and reasons for this case study of East Africa, this 
section will describe how the study was conducted and the data obtained. This is a descriptive 
case study which uses quantitative and qualitative data and a few observations to support the 
findings. The largest part of the research as well as the data collection is based on second-
order research, meaning the analysis of texts and statistics. The study therefore makes use of 
the information available and will not delve into the underlying reasons of policies or data, 
hence the use of descriptive methodology6. To gain access to as many different angles as 
possible, this study uses numerous authors and sources from a variety of media, however, 
mainly academic journals and books. As King and his colleagues point out: “Harvesting 
relevant information from others’ data, (…) may often be the best way to obtain relevant 
information” (1995: 455). 
The advantage of the currently available statistical research tools is that they allow for large 
amounts of data to be used relatively inexpensively and that the research can be replicated. 
However, the disadvantage is a danger of ‘misplaced correctness’, i.e. overquoting data when 
the focus should be on interpreting it  (Neuman, 2006: 335). By constantly distinguishing 
between the interesting and the relevant, it is hoped this study escapes this fallacy.
In addition to the secondary sources, some primary sources are used, for example websites 
from ministries and institutions. Also, part of the research was conducted by observing the 
real-life context of the Nile in East Africa. The author was based at the University of Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania, for six months, from January 2011 until July 2011. During that time I had 
the privilege of talking informally with fishermen, activists and other students of the subject 
matter. Their experiences highlighted the importance of a multi-layered, qualitative approach 
to the Nile. 
Triangulation, the combination of different research methodologies, is used to be able to 
encompass the complexity of hydropolitical relations that “are rarely transparent or easily 
quantifiable” (Zeitoun & Allan, 2008: 3) and increase the study’s validity (Foster, 1996: 91). 
Triangulation offers the opportunity to crosscheck data and gain different insights (Cassim, 
2012) and flexibility (Gerring, 2007: 33). Quantitative analysis, in the form of statistics, 
6 Although, in some cases the decisions that led up to the evidence provided is part of the analysis and more 
explanatory background is required. However, this addition does not make the study exploratory by nature.
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addresses what the situation in the NRB is and the actors involved on the regional level. 
Qualitative analysis answers the question of why the situation has come about and what 
impact this has had. Using triangulation allows for evidence to be viewed synergistically 
(Huberman & Miles, 2002: 7). 
Many of the findings are presented in tables, figures, and maps. Statistical data like the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), population size, hydrological data etc. is presented in tables for the 
reader to take in data in a straightforward and visual manner. Maps of the regions are meant 
to contextualise the various levels and locations to one another. In general, I tried to mix 
genres to support the analysis and increase transparency. The power ratio organigrams which 
is introduced in Chapter 2 allows the measurability of power. This increases the internal 
validity of the study and allows other researchers to replicate the study or apply the same 
framework to other cases.
A further aspect of the presentation of information in the present study is the cross-case study 
component, meaning the comparison of data in the present case study to other cases studies 
done by other researchers. According to John Gerring (2007: 22), most case studies feature to 
contextualise or clarify distinctions. For example, most readers have no comprehension of 
how much 84m³ annual water flow is. Is that a lot or little? The Nile’s average annual water 
flow makes up only 2% of the Amazon’s, 15% of the Mississippi’s and 20% of the Mekong’s 
annual water flow (Mohamoda, 2003: 7). This comparison across the immediate case 
illuminates that for the world’s longest river, this is relatively little water volume. Therefore, 
some cross-case study elements are utilised for the purposes of verification. In light of the 
fact that power is seen relational, Egypt, as hydro-hegemon, is repeatedly used to contrast its 
power capabilities with the relative lack thereof upstream, i.e. it is an external variable to the 
study.
1.7 Limitations, Delimitations and Assumptions
The study was affected by limitations of time, scope, and finances, which are discussed here. 
First, the scope of the study was limited to a regional perspective on a specific geographical 
region, namely East Africa as delineated by the EAC. In order to clarify the relationship and 
units of analysis clearly, the author assembled Table 1.1 (page 15). The table defines the 
units, where they are located, who governs them and some description. For example, the table 
clearly shows that the EAC encompasses a territory that spans the five Partner States;
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Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda. Furthermore, the table highlights how 
Ethiopia’s only connection, in terms of analysis, to the EAC is by also being classified as 
upstream. This limitation in terms of the geographical unit means that individual state 
policies are mostly put aside in favour of EAC policies.
Consequently some actors might be given less agency than they deserve as the affected 
populations. Particularly the Arab Spring, which has been haunting Egyptian society since the 
end of 2010, is largely excluded from the analysis. First, this is based on a methodological 
reason; the case study focuses on East Africa and merely uses Egypt, the hydro-hegemon, as 
a benchmark to highlight the changing hydropolitical configuration of the NRB. Second, as 
will be mentioned later in the discussion, the Egyptian government has not changed strategies 
and tactics to control the Nile water flow since they came to power. The Arab Spring was 
about domestic foreign policy issues and has thus not resulted in large-scale foreign policy 
changes. This is the study’s largest limitation.
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Table 1.1: Geographic and political units in the Nile River Basin 
(assembled by the author)
Geographic unit Size Political 
institution
Description
Nile River/Nile Surface water flow; 
84km³ per annum
Nile River Basin 
(NRB)
3 million km² 
catchment area 
(Map 1.1, p.3)
Nile Basin 
Initiative (NBI)
(Map 1.2, p.3)
A World Bank Initiative which 
brings together the ten riparian 
states 
Downstream 
(analytical sub-
basin)
Sudan and Egypt Permanent Joint 
Technical 
Committee (PJTC)
Created under the bilateral 
1959 Agreement which binds 
the two riparian states hydro-
politically together
Upstream 
(analytical sub-
basin)
Burundi, DRC, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda
2012: permanent 
river basin 
commission
Except the DRC and Eritrea7
the upstream riparians signed 
the CFA which has to be 
ratified until March 2012
Nile Equatorial 
Sub-Basin 
(NELSB)
White Nile sub-
basin 
Nile Equatorial 
Lakes Subsidiary 
Action Programme 
(NELSAP)
Investment-oriented sub-basin 
division by the NBI for the 
NELSB
Eastern Nile Sub-
Basin (ENSB)
Blue Nile sub-basin Eastern Nile 
Subsidiary Action 
Programme 
(ENSAP)
Investment-oriented sub-basin 
division by the NBI for the 
ENSB
Lake Victoria 
Basin (LVB)
184 000 km² 
catchment area (Map 
1.4, p.10)
Lake Victoria 
Fisheries 
Organisation 
(LVFO)
Management of common fish 
stock in the Lake Victoria 
under the EAC
Lake Victoria 
Basin Commission 
(LVBC)
Management of water 
resources under the auspices of 
the EAC
East Africa 1.82 million km²
(incl. water)
East African 
Community 
(EAC)
(Map 1.3, p.10)
Partner States: Burundi, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, 
Uganda
7Eritrea has always been on the sideline of the Nile water negotiations and continues to be an observer rather 
than a fully-fledged member of the NBI. Since independence, the DRC has been subject to political instability 
and its Eastern Kivu region continues to be embroiled in protracted intrastate conflicts. 
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In addition, the scope of publicly available information is limited. Having limited the study to 
East Africa and drawing the physical borders around the Partner States of the EAC, the 
researcher experienced some difficulty of finding statistics that matched the case. 
Considering that statistics are created for governments and organisations, it is not surprising 
that the unit of anaylsis in most statistics is the state (Thomas, 1996: 125). It was not always 
possible to perfectly match the available statistics to this study’s unit of analysis and there 
was some danger of committing an Ecological Fallacy or Reductionism8. The overwhelming 
use of the countries as social units in statistical data collection meant that the original focus 
on the LVB had to be enlarged to East Africa as a whole. In view of the dependency of the 
populations on the Nile’s resources outside the immediate basin area, coupled with the fact 
that policies affecting the basin are made on the regional, not basin-level, enlarging the unit 
to encompass the EAC at large was a logical step to take and should not influence the 
findings of the study.
Another limitation for this study, or for that matter any study that makes use of secondary 
data, is that the reliability of secondary data is uncertain. By way of example, according to 
different sources the predicted population growth in the LVB varies from 500 million in 2025 
(Mohamoda, 2003: 1) or 500 million 25 years later, in 2050 (Waterbury, 2002), to the slightly 
lower average growth rate of around two percent which would amount to around 600 million 
in 2050 (UNEP, 2010: 70). Statistical differences can occur due to sources’ use of different 
data sets, different weighing of factors or interpretation of results. A secondary researcher 
finds it hard to discern the background of data interpretation and collection and one has to 
rely on the source alone. This problem is compounded by the fact that many United Nations 
(UN) institutions borrow data from each other, in other words, there is often no other source 
to check the data against as the trace leads back to the same source. As a general rule, this 
study will rely on the newest available statistics and on the most reliable sources, which is to 
say, independent sources and cross-reference the data where possible.
8 Ecological Fallacy: “An error in explanation in which empirical data about associations found among large-scale 
units of analysis are greatly overgeneralised and treated as evidence for statements about relationships among 
much smaller units.” Reductionism: “An error in explanation in which empirical data about associations found 
among small-scale units of analysis are greatly overgeneralised and treated as evidence for statements about 
relationships among much larger units.” (Neuman, 2006: 168-169)
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A further point that perhaps needs to be mentioned in this context is that laws, policies, and 
regulations will largely be taken at face value. The implementation gap between policies that 
exist on paper and how, or if at all, they are implemented, is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. Only in a few cases, such as the East African environmental laws where 
breaches have been widely reported (for example by S. M. M’Nyiri, 2010), will this 
weakness of policy implementation be addressed. 
Although this study does no more than touch upon the implementation gap, it can be argued 
however, that this gap is especially wide in the environmental policy sphere due to a lack of 
political will and insufficient state structures. These deficiencies in the East African countries 
may be inferred from their low scores on the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) in the 
category of Stateness which is the degree of the state’s monopoly on the use of force, state 
identity, interference of religious dogmas and basin administration (BTI, 2012). The East 
African states average at 7.2 out of ten, with Rwanda at eight and the DRC at five describing 
the opposing ends. These scores imply, among other things, that the East African 
governments are unable to fully implement their policies. The critical reader and analyst 
should keep this in mind to understand that the written word and on the ground processes are 
not always coherent.
During the course of the study it became apparent that the fixed period of time that is its 
focus was a limitation, and that it was sometimes necessary to refer to data that falls outside 
this period. The data covers the processes taking place in East Africa from 2003 to 2012, 
making the present study a diachronic9 single-case-study as it takes a historical look at the 
region and analysis the recent political developments. The analysis of the social processes is 
based on the developments since 2003, the year the regional unification process began.
One of the main criticisms levelled against case studies is the potential subjectivity of 
evidence collection. On one hand, this can lead to a skewed analysis and misinterpretation of 
the evidence presented. On the other hand, it is this ‘fuzziness’ that allows for the hypothesis-
generating capacity of the data (Gerring, 2007: 41). In the present study data has been 
collected for the purpose of analysing the impacts of East Africa’s growing power on Egypt’s 
hydro-hegemony in the NRB. The Hydro-hegemony framework is the filter through which 
9 A diachronic case study refers to “observing the case or some sub-set within the case units over time” as 
opposed to synchronic studies which refer to a ‘snap-shot’ (Gerring, 2007: 21).
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data is seen and interpreted. The operationalisation of concepts should therefore limit the 
degree of subjectivity and increase the study’s internal validity. 
Lastly, the discussion of Water Wars in hydropolitical literature has shown that assumptions 
of how the environment and the economy interact are of fundamental importance. Yohannes 
contends: 
The point of departure in any discussion on hydrological governance must start 
from a shared recognition of the potential collision between the growing human 
needs for renewable resources and weakening of regenerative capacity of the 
region’s hydro-ecology (2009: 77). 
Taking Yohannes’ argument into account, this study focuses on the set goals of the EAC and 
not on their environmental feasibility in terms of water availability. However, if all projects 
currently being planned along the Nile banks were to be implemented, the Nile would dry 
out. The regional and state bodies can speak for themselves and this dissertation can analyse 
their goals and developments but in all of this, the needs of species other than humans and of 
the river itself should not be ignored.
1.8 Chapter Outline
In Chapter 1 the study’s context was described, pointed out the guiding research questions, 
explored the purpose and value of this study, established the motivations for doing the 
research, determined the reasons behind East Africa as a regional complex and delineated the 
areas of interest. 
Chapter 2 will attempt to provide greater insight into the Hydro-hegemony framework. It will 
do so by first summarising the available IR literature on hydropolitics up until the present, 
and then by discussing in detail the definition of power as well as asymmetrical power 
relations in transboundary river basins. The second part of Chapter 2 will focus on the 
operationalisation power in transboundary waterways and incorporate the region as level of 
analysis into the Hydro-hegemony framework.
Based on the definitions and conceptualisation in Chapter 2, which provide a sufficient 
theoretical backdrop for the analysis, Chapter 3 aims at providing a broad descriptive outline 
of the hydropolitical complexity that makes up the NRB. This is done to establish the nexus 
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of legal, historical, political, and hydrological factors which form the backdrop to the current 
hydropolitical situation. Egypt has established hydro-hegemony, i.e. control, over the Nile
water flow, through a variety of strategies, notably the 1959 Agreement for the Full 
Utilisation of the Nile Waters (henceforth 1959 Agreement) which guarantees Egypt the 
‘historic right’ and legitimacy until today. Yet, the historic weakness of East Africa as a 
result of colonialisation and proxy wars has been changing since 2007 as the EAC is building 
up its economic, military, knowledge and hydrological capabilities. Regional cooperation has 
increased the regional trade volume and funding has gone into infrastructure projects, 
attracted foreign investments in large-scale projects and as a result the economic, agricultural 
and dams require an increasing amount of water.
What increased upstream water utilization means for Egypt and the power status quo, is the 
subject of the analysis in Chapter 4. While Chapter 3 will establish the asymmetrical power 
relationship between upstream and downstream riparians, in Chapter 4 it will be shown that 
the East African actions upstream have a ‘ripple effect’ all the way to, and in, Egypt. The 
analysis is done to show how East Africa’s increase in power has affected Egypt’s power 
position, particularly in light of the Arab Spring and the resulting lack of clearly defined 
foreign policies. 
Finally, Chapter 5 will briefly synthesize the findings reached in the previous chapters. 
Considering the historic instability of East Africa the effect of some tentative future scenarios 
on the Nile’s flow will be advanced. Based on the case study findings some generalisations 
for other African river basins will be outlined and possible future research areas identified
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CHAPTER 2: HYDRO-HEGEMONY: AN 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the study with a framework of analysis for the 
power changes in the NRB. The study of transboundary rivers in IR is a fairly new field and 
has only gained prominence since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. The discussion 
of power in relation to water distribution is even newer. To place this study in the ongoing 
theoretical discussion, the chapter begins with a brief outline of the academic discussions that 
have framed the subject. This is followed by a detailed description of the London Water 
Research Group’s (LWRG’s) Hydro-hegemony framework and its conceptual pillars, 
particularly power. 
The Hydro-hegemony framework combines power indicators and conflict analysis in river 
basins and can thereby explain the absence of water wars, even in basins where power is 
highly asymmetrically distributed. Yet, it is also caught in the state-centric ‘territorial trap’ 
which has defined mainstream IR literature for decades. Therefore, a large part of this chapter 
will discuss the state-centric discourse in IR and strive to get away from that to a regional 
analysis of East Africa. 
The chapter will also introduce Ana Cascao’s framework of counter-hegemonic processes, 
which she bases on the Hydro-hegemony framework. Counter hegemony is rooted in the 
assumption that power is not static and can be challenged through several counter-strategies, 
which can be applied to East Africa. 
2.1 Hydropolitics in International Relations Literature 
The objective of this review is to outline the main positions that have framed the 
hydropolitical discussions in IR over the last two decades. It is not to be understood as a 
complete bibliography, such as can be found in Terje Tvedt’s The Nile: an annotated 
bibliography (2004) covering both the social and natural sciences. Both the Swedish Water 
House’s (SWH’s) literature review of the link between intra-national conflict and 
transboundary watercourses (2004) since the 1990s and Dahilon Y. Mohamoda’s Nile Basin 
Cooperation (2003), offer empirically-oriented and detailed reviews. 
While these reviews summarize the political science literature, the UN institutions provide 
authoritative geographic and statistical information. The United Nations Environmental 
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Programme (UNEP) published a freely available overview of African water governance and 
management, the Africa Water Atlas in 2010. The Food and Agricultural Organization’s 
(FAO’s) Aquastat website (http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/) gathers relevant and up-to-
date data on water related domains, focusing on water scarce regions, i.e. also the NRB. 
Under the umbrella of UN Water, 26 UN institutions and members gathers evidence and 
coordinate all water-related activities, notably UN Water publishes the World Water 
Assessment Programme (WWAP) with yearly updated data (UNESCO, 2012). 
2.1.1 Water Wars or Cooperation?
The majority of IR hydropolitical literature on the Nile River revolves around the question 
whether water scarcity10 leads to cooperation or violent conflict. The Neo-Malthusians argue 
that Water Wars will break out in transboundary river basins and their writing can thus be 
placed in the larger post-Cold War literature which links the environment directly to national 
security concerns (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Klare, 2001 among others). The hypothesis is that 
growing populations put increasing pressure on freshwater resources in transboundary river
basins until it threatens states’ national security which will lead to violent conflicts, even 
wars. J.R. Starr coined the term Water Wars (1991) and thereby laid the foundation for 
research into transboundary river basins in the early 1990s.
The Water War hypothesis has since been disregarded due to its environmental determinism 
and lack of empirical evidence for Water Wars (Allan, 1999: i; Yoffé & Wolf, 1999: 199). 
The paradigm has since shifted to state cooperation (Allan, 2000; Turton, 2005). 
Functionalists and neo-functionalists argue that while water scarcity can be a casus belli, 
more often than not, it leads to cooperation (Wolf quoted in Doyle, 2006). Yoffé and her
colleagues concluded from a worldwide qualitative study that none of the indicators11 for 
international water conflicts showed a significant increase in interstate conflict (2003). 
Cooperation prevailed in most transboundary water resource basins. 
As a matter of fact, it emerged from the data that the higher the overall dependency on the 
watercourse the more states invest in sustainable solutions. Those conflicts that break out are 
10 Defined as less than 1000 m³ of renewable freshwater per capita per annum (Mohamoda, 2003: 8).
11 These are: spatial proximity, government type, climate, basin water stress, dams and infrastructure 
development, and the dependence on water for agriculture (Yoffé et al., 2003: 1110).
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low level and do not exclude cooperation; they might serve as a catalyst for cooperation as 
states realize that water is too important to fight over (Gleditsch et al., 2006).
Whether Water War proponent or opponents are more empirically correct is a matter of 
discussion and Othieno and Zondi are right to point out that whatever the case may be, 
governments have used water as justification to go to war (2006: 1). Additionally, authors 
like Selby (2007), Jacobs (2009) and Allan (2000) have pointed out that both paradigms 
subscribe to the neo-realist norms of an anarchic international system in which states are the 
sole actors. The researchers on the cooperation and conflict paradigms merely reach opposing 
conclusions on the consequences of state interaction.
2.1.2 Cooperation and Power
Researchers then went on to analyse how interstate cooperation can best be brought about to 
create win-win situations (Jägerskog, 2008: 1). The conflict angle in transboundary 
waterways was relegated to the intrastate level, especially in Africa. John Waterbury framed 
the question of state-to-state cooperation in the classical prisoner’s dilemma scenario and 
came to the conclusion that only way to build trust between co-riparians is through 
institutionalised cooperation of the co-riparian states, supported by the international 
community (2002). The Oregon School established the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute 
Database (TFDD) (Institute for Water and Watersheds, 2012) and found support for 
Waterbury’s theory that institutional capacity along the river basins is the best way to 
overcome tensions (Yoffé & Wolf, 1999). Juha Uitto and Alfred Duda (2002), working for 
the Global Environmental Facility, the main funding organisations for the environmental 
management of transboundary waterways, come to similar conclusions; the key to the 
sustainable management of transboundary rivers are manageable strategic actions which 
strengthen trust between countries.
Based on these findings Leif Ohlsson proposed the analysis of water conflicts on two levels; 
the first order resource being the availability of water and the second order resource the 
individual and institutional capacities, or abilities, to overcome scarcity (1999). The 
Maryland school found that cooperation in the past is more likely to induce cooperation in the 
future and the likelihood of multilateral agreements is much lower than that of bilateral 
agreements (Conca, 2006). The team around Gleditsch et al. (2006) also found support for 
Allan’s ‘Virtual Water’ (Allan, 1998, 2001) theory. Virtual water is water “embedded in 
water intensive commodities” which are traded from regions with water surplus to regions 
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with water deficits, thereby creating a water, food, and trade nexus (Allan, 1998: 1). Finally, 
the Tshwane School concentrates on Southern African transboundary watercourses but its
Hydropolitical Complex (HPC) theory can also be applied to other basins. Anthony Turton 
argued that not all basins are equal and not all states in the basin are equal (2005). This 
inequality is rooted in different military strength, economic development, as well as the 
availability of water, in other words hydropolitical power.
Finally, the LWRG, around Zeitoun and Warner (2006), has further conceptualised power in 
hydropolitics in the Hydro-hegemony framework. They combine their multidisciplinary 
backgrounds to tie in engineering, previous IR findings on power indicators, and the conflict 
and cooperation discourse. Also part of the LWRG is Ana Cascao, who has done 
groundbreaking work on resistance strategies to hydro-hegemony in the NRB. 
To be able to incorporate the many aspects that make up asymmetrical power distribution and 
degrees of conflict, Zeitoun and Warner (2006) created the Hydro-hegemony framework. 
First of all, the Hydro-hegemony framework is based on the assumption that “the absence of 
war does not mean the absence of conflict” (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006: 441). However, there 
are degrees of conflict. Secondly, for any state to achieve the consolidated control over a 
transboundary waterway it has to apply “a suite of power-related” tactics (Zeitoun & Warner, 
2006: 436). 
2.2 Hydro-Hegemony
The LWRG’s definition of hydro-hegemony is:
Hydro-hegemony is the consolidated control on the river basin level, achieved 
through water resource control strategies (...). The strategies are enabled (...) by 
the exploitation of existing power asymmetries within a weak international
institutional context. Political processes outside the water sector configure basin-
wide hydro-political relations (...) (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006: 435).
This section will highlight the different aspects of hydro-hegemony as mentioned by 
Zeitoun and Warner.
2.2.1 Relative Power
Underpinning hydro-hegemony is relative power. This section will point out what power 
means for NRB and what power is. 
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First of all, power is one of the most contested concepts in political science and Zeitoun and 
Warner refer to the lack of a precise understanding of it as the “classical unresolved issue” in 
IR (2006: 442). Lukes goes even further by saying that power is by definition contested, 
“indeed, to engage in such disputes is itself to engage in politics” (1974: 26). It follows that 
whatever definition of power is applied, it can always be criticized for leaving out some 
issues. Yet, a conceptualisation of power requires the exclusion of some indicators. For the 
purposes of this study, the power of one actor relative to the other riparian actors determines: 
∑ Who the hydro-hegemon is, as this actor has most power (Figure 2.1, page 26).
∑ How hydro-hegemony is achieved, i.e. what strategies are applied (Figure 2.2, page 
28).
∑ How hydro-hegemony is challenged through the growing power of other actors 
(Figure 2.4, page 32).
∑ What new strategies will be used by the hydro-hegemon to remain in control over the 
water resources as its power is contested in the basin.
These indicators state what power does but not what it is. Antonio Gramsci is one author that 
has attempted to operationalise power and has hugely influenced the other authors used in 
this study. Gramsci wrote about Italian society in the early 20th century, to explain the 
weakness of the communist movement, which was unable to spread due to ‘capitalist 
hegemony’ (Selby, 2007: 4). He was jailed for leading the communist party under 
Mussolini’s fascist regime. Gramsci wrote the Prison Notebooks from 1929-1935 in Italy, 
although they were only translated and published in English in 1971. He conceptualised 
power as more than the use of violence, but as the acceptance of an order:
This same group [a subordinated group] has, for reasons of submissions and 
intellectual subordination, adopted a conception which is not its own but is 
borrowed from another group (quoted in Lukes, 1974: 47). 
As a matter of fact, this kind of power represents the exact opposite of violence. Thus power 
over masses is made up of both coercion and oppression; it entails legitimacy, leadership, 
ideas, knowledge, and consent (Cascao, 2008: 14). 
Neo-Gramscians, like Steven Lukes, Robert Cox, and Ana Cascao from the LWRG, built 
their theories around this insight about power. Only four years after the first English 
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translation of Gramsci’s work was published, Lukes’ book Radical Power incorporated 
Gramscian insights by conceptualising ‘group into action’, observable behaviour, and non-
action, as well as compliance with the status quo. Robert Cox (1987) has been rudimental to 
transferring Lukes’ three-dimensional approach to the international sphere. Cox’s Historic 
Materialism focuses on the particularities of eras and the social construction and organisation 
of production (O'Brian & Williams, 2004). Cox is influenced by constructivist tenets but his 
main focus is the historical representation of power constructs at different levels. Ana Cascao 
was the first to draw on Lukes’ (1974) and Cox’s (1987) multidimensional conceptualisation 
of power and apply it to the hydropolitical context (2008). 
The first dimension of power is the state’s actual ability to mobilize capabilities such as 
military might, economic strength, political support, and inherent geographic factors. It is the 
‘hard’ power of states (Nye, 2005) and focuses on actualised behaviour and their “productive 
and destructive potentials” (Cox, 1987: 98). In neorealist terms, this is the only measure of 
state power, yet non-actions also contribute the status quo.
The second dimension refers to control of the institutionalised ‘rules of the game’. The status 
quo defenders have the power to decide which items will reach the agenda and which 
“decisions are prevented from being taken on potential issues” (Lukes, 1974: 20, emphases 
included). At the international level this is also referred to as a state’s bargaining power 
(Zeitoun & Allan, 2008), which includes the ability to ‘mobilise bias’ and enforce 
a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures that 
operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and 
groups [or states] at the expense of others (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970 quoted in 
Lukes, 1974: 17). 
This tactic can be supported by coercive measures like threatening sanctions, i.e. to confront 
other states with compliance or non-compliance in formal and informal institutions (Lukes, 
1974: 17). In addition, incentives can negotiate the prevailing world order through 
concessions and compromise, while convincing weaker actors that they should accept 
‘universal’ values (Cox, 1987: 99).
The third power dimension alludes to the ideological dimension of power, whereby an order 
is internalized and does not get called into question. Lukes explains that it is the power 
exercised of A over B by 
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influencing, shaping and determining his very wants (....) to prevent people, to 
whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions 
and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of 
things (1974: 23). 
This power can be exercised by social groups and states alike. It can be done, for example, by 
securitizing issues and thereby putting them outside the political realm.
On the world level hegemony is achieved when one actor dominates all three power 
dimensions. In case of hydro-hegemony three factors support a state’s hydro-hegemony: i) its 
riparian position, ii) its relative power, and iii) its exploitation potential (see Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1 depicts the pillars that support a state’s hydro-hegemony according to Naff and 
Matson (1984) and has been adapted by Zeitoun and Warner (2006: 451). The first pillar 
(from left) signifies the geographic position in the basin, i.e. upstream or downstream. Pillar 
two represents Lukes’ power conceptualisation and pillar three denotes the state’s ability to 
exploit the water resources it has secured. The third column includes the exploitation 
potential which means the actual ability of states to utilise the water. The relative size of the 
pillars reflects the weighing of factors in the framework. Power, the middle pillar, is thus the
most important determinant of hydro-hegemony.
Figure 2.1: Pillars of Hydro-Hegemony (Naff & Matson, 1984)
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Analogously, the riparian position is inherent to the riparian state as it cannot be altered. 
Power, however, is relational and depends on the actions of each riparian. The final 
hydropolitical situation along a transboundary river basin is the result of all the actors’
processes and actions combined (Cascao, 2008: 17). Power explains why states, although not 
violently forced to do so, comply with the status quo of unequal resource distribution 
(Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 437). This includes both − the actual power and the potential 
power, its possession and its exercise (Turton, 2005; Lukes, 1974: 12)12. Moreover, power 
provides the only explanation as to why the most downstream state manages to establish 
hydro-hegemony over transboundary water resources as is the case in the NRB where Egypt 
has established itself as hydro-hegemon. Finally, exploitation potential is neither fixed nor 
relational. It depends on the ecosystem and water flow. To illustrate, all riparian states could 
have an equal amount of technical capabilities but could soon run out of water. In most cases, 
however, exploitation potential is closely linked to the power indicators.
2.2.2 Hegemonic Strategies and Tactics
The LWRG’s framework assumes that the hydro-hegemon wants to maintain its consolidated 
control over the transboundary water resources and to do so, will use various water resource 
control tactics and strategies. Resource capture refers to the unilateral acquisition of 
transboundary water resources, affecting the quality and quantity of water (Zeitoun & 
Warner, 2006: 444). By utilising water, the hydro-hegemon decreases the other riparians’ 
ability to do so and creates ‘facts on the ground’. Containment signifies engaging the other 
riparians to achieve compliance through coercive means; integration of non-hegemons 
through incentives can be a strategy to prevent them from ‘developing successful counter-
strategies’ (Cascao, 2008: 16). 
According to the Hydro-hegemony framework, the hydro-hegemon uses four water resource 
control tactics: coercion, utilitarianism, norms, and ideology (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 444-
446). Coercion can be achieved through military force, threats, and covert action. An 
example of covert action could be the support of intra-state rebel groups which weaken the 
central government. Utilitarian mechanisms can be trade incentives, diplomatic recognition, 
military protection, and shared interest projects meant to ensure positive compliance with the 
12Puissance, potential power, is the possession of a nuclear bomb which lends power, but not in an actualised 
sense such as pouvoir which is the power to stop the rocket from being launched (Zeitoun and Warner, 
2006:442).
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hegemon. The most stable regime is achieved through normative tactics (Zeitoun & Warner, 
2006: 442) which ensure the preservation of the status quo by constructing a ‘natural order of 
things’. Treaties are an example of this as they often enshrine existing power inequalities 
which allow the hegemon to impose compliance due to the absence of an enforcer on the 
supra-state level. Ideological compliance shapes the perception of the transboundary water 
resource. Securitization (Buzan & Weaver, 2003), knowledge construction, and sanctioning 
discourses are used.
Depending on the water resource control strategy and tactic chosen by the hydro-hegemon, its 
hegemony can be perceived positive, neutral, or negative. Positive leadership can lead to the 
equitable distribution of the resource, whereas negative hydro-hegemony entails an 
increasingly unequal resource distribution. Since these are subjective meanings, whether 
hydro-hegemony is perceived positively, neutrally or negatively, depends on each actor. 
Figure 2.2: Water Resource Control Strategies and Tactics (Zeitoun &
Warner, 2006: 445) 
Using Figure 2.2, Zeitoun and Warner (2006: 445) demonstrate how water resource control 
tactics and strategies fit into the wider hegemonic control consolidation process. This can be 
achieved through the abovementioned strategies, unilateral action, coercion, or cooperation. 
Within the context of highly asymmetrical power relations, the distribution of 
water is largely determined by the strategy pursued by the hegemonic power 
(Selby, 2007: 2).
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International support, financial mobilization, and geo-political factors underpin the hydro-
hegemon’s position and give “more powerful states its competitive edge” (Zeitoun & Warner, 
2006: 449). On the bottom axis Zeitoun and Warner identify those factors which are outside 
the hydro-hegemon’s influence but, nevertheless, play a part in securing the consolidated 
control over transboundary water resources.
Since the hydro-hegemon is most powerful, its tactics and strategies will determine the nature 
of the interaction in the basin. At one end of the resource control scale are genuine 
competition and at the other full cooperation. Most river basins lie somewhere in the middle; 
a degree of sharing exists, while consolidated control over contested water favours the hydro-
hegemon. Different kinds of interaction emerge among the co-riparians depending on the 
type of control tactic and strategy. Shared control leads to a more cooperative environment 
than contested control which makes the relationship more competitive and anarchic.
2.2.3 Intensity of Conflict
As was mentioned above, a basin must not be at war, yet this does not mean that it has 
achieved consolidated peace. The SWH compared several definitions of conflict and 
condensed it to “a social situation in which at least two actors try, at the same time, to gain 
access to the same set of resources”. This is the definition of conflict which will be used in 
this study (SWH, 2004: 2). Importantly, conflict does not need to be violent which implies 
that there is a scale of conflict and cooperation (Azar, 1980). The Oregon School translated 
this to the basin level.
The Water Event Intensity Scale by Yoffé et al. (2003) (Figure 2.3) analyzed historical 
indicators from 1948-1999 on water conflict / cooperation patterns and came up with a 
relational scale from -7 to +7. The data includes events between two or more riparian states. 
The scale aims at taking account of the many degrees of conflict that define a basin situation.
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Figure 2.3 Degrees of Conflict (Yoffé et al., 2003)
As mentioned above, Egypt’s hydro-hegemony could be one of the social institutions 
averting armed conflict. Since hydro-hegemony is exercised through convincing other actors 
to follow its lead implicitly, violent defiance of the hydro-hegemon is usually not an option 
(Frey, 1993; Green Cross International, 2000; Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). 
2.3 Counter Hydro-Hegemony
Shapland (1997) and Cascao (2005) were the first researchers to conceptualise and 
operationalise counter-hegemony. Ana Cascao is one of the academics involved in the 
LWRG and bases her theory of counter-hegemony on Zeitoun and Warner’s Hydro-
hegemony framework. Using the same building blocks of power, she understands hydro-
hegemony and conflictual relations within their framework but expands on it. 
Due to its neo-Gramscian roots, the Hydro-hegemony framework acknowledges that change 
in relative power is possible but does not conceptualise the processes involved. The furthest 
• -7 Formal Declaration of War
•-6 Extensive War Acts causing deaths, dislocation or 
high strategic cost
• -5 Small scale military acts
• -4 Political-military hostile actions
•-3 Diplomatic-economic hostile actions
•-2 Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in 
interaction
•-1 Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in 
interaction
•+1 Minor official exchanges, talks or policy     
expressions--mild verbal support
•+2 Official verbal support of goals, values, or 
regime
•+3 Cultural or scientific agreement or support
•+4 Non-military economic, technological or 
industrial agreement
•+5 Military economic or strategic support
•+6 International Freshwater Treaty; Major strategic 
alliance
•+7 Voluntary unification into one nation
Stellenbosch Univeristy  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Zeitoun and Warner go to acknowledge hydro-hegemonic processes in their paper is by 
saying: 
The non-hegemonic state will resort primarily to its agenda-framing (second 
dimension) power. Such power, as we have seen, includes recourse to morality 
and international law, de-securitization, issue linkage, economic development, 
alternative funding sources, negotiations, and generation of positive-sum 
outcomes (2006: 454).
Zeitoun and Warner’s analysis of transboundary river basins results in two mechanisms; 
firstly, the hydro-hegemon determines the nature of the struggle (2006: 452) and secondly, 
power is a zero-sum game. Since power is asymmetrically distributed in a hydro-hegemonic 
setting, the strategies of resistance and counter-resistance are determined by the ‘status quo
defender’. Depending on the nature of interaction, whether it is positive, neutral, or negative, 
non-hegemons are forced to react differently. 
By the same token, since water is a finite resource, greater power and thus greater control 
over the water means that power growth in non-hegemons takes power away from the hydro-
hegemon. By way of example, Egypt depends on the Nile for 95% of its freshwater supply. 
The more other countries in the NRB are able to mobilize financial resources and utilise the 
water resources of the Nile, the less power Egypt can exert. In case of the Nile, Egypt’s 
dependency is enhanced by its downstream position. Other than by its power and water 
resource control strategies, Egypt cannot influence the water flow it depends on (Figure 2.1, 
page 26). 
Counter-hegemony is a process whereby the consent of non-hegemons with the hegemon is 
breaking up and an alternative regime is created. In postulating the concept of counter-
hegemony, Cascao assumes hegemony to be in place, against which non-hegemons react. 
Consequently, there are two phases of counter-hegemony: the reactive phase, wherein the 
non-hegemon resists, and an active phase which is defined by the creation of an alternative 
order. It is the latter that goes beyond a mere challenge to the hegemon but is indeed counter-
hegemonic; only the creation of an alternative order warrants the term ‘counter’, otherwise 
actors merely challenge the existing order (Warner, 2007).
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Figure 2.4: Abstract model of hegemony and counter-hegemony (Cascao, 
2008: 16)
The first step of counter-hegemony is defining the object of resistance. This is followed by 
the active phase of counter-hegemony: challenges to the current regime, contesting the 
legitimacy of the hegemon and finally, if successful, the creation of a new status quo. 
In her 2009 paper, Cascao applied her counter-hegemonic framework of analysis to the NRB 
and critically analysed Ethiopian counter-hegemonic processes against Egypt. This was a 
groundbreaking study as she provided the first conceptual and empirical backdrop against 
which theoretical power changes in a transboundary river basin could be analysed. She 
showed that consent and contestation to hegemony coexist, since all types of hegemony are 
based on consent and coercion (Cascao, 2009). Consequently, all riparians have agency and 
influence over their hydropolitical situation.
She identified seven counter-strategies: i) reactive diplomacy, ii) active diplomacy, iii) 
cooperation, iv) mobilising international funding, v) the construction of expertise-based 
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knowledge, vi) discourse alternatives, vii) claim on legal principles. As will be shown in the 
fourth chapter of the present study, these counter-hegemonic strategies can also be applied to 
East Africa. East Africa aims for equitable water distribution which would require a 
redefinition of the current status quo. But East Africa has gone beyond the reactive phase of 
counter-hydro-hegemony in the 1980s; it is actively creating an alternative regime through 
the multilateral LVBC and, notably, the CFA. It is also building dams with new sources of 
funding like the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of China. East Africa’s multilateral, equitable, 
regionalised approach to water distribution could undermine Egypt’s access to water, as well 
as its legitimacy as hydro-hegemon. The consequences of these counter-hegemonic processes 
for Egypt are the focus of this study. The actions of East Africa force Egypt, if it wants to 
maintain the status quo, to change its strategies and tactics (see Figure 2.2, page 28, for a 
representation of Water Resource Control Strategies and Tactics). 
2.4 Strengths of the LWRG’s Framework
Having sufficiently described the theoretical framework used in the present study, this section 
will look at the two main strengths of the Hydro-hegemony framework. Firstly, it draws 
different theoretical discussion together and unites them into one analytical framework 
(Figure 2.5, page 34). 
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Figure 2.5: The Hydro-hegemony framework: Bringing theories together 
(Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 453)
According to Selby, the Hydro-hegemony framework provides a ‘powerful and corrective’ 
input to the existing hydropolitical literature (2007: 2). Relative power is a potent way to 
explain why Egypt, a downstream state, has been able to consolidate control over water 
resources and simultaneously prevent violent conflict. When Zeitoun and Warner first 
published the Hydro-hegemony framework in 2006, power imbalances between co-riparians 
were barely discussed and had been lost in the discussion around conflict and cooperation 
(Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 436). 
Secondly, the theory allows for change in the status quo, since power is not an intrinsic 
quality but relational. Gramsci was the first to point out that hegemonic power is founded on 
material capabilities, ideas and knowledge construction, and generates non-coercive consent. 
Hegemony is more stable than pure dominance, precisely because it is rooted in consent. His 
theoretical foundations have since been transferred to the international level by Lukes and 
Cox, both of whom consider power relational to the other actors. Consequently, power is 
negotiable and can change over time.
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2.5 Criticism of the LWRG’s Framework
Despite the strengths of the Hydro-hegemony framework, some vital criticisms have also 
been directed at LWRG’s operationalisation by authors like Selby (2007) and Jacobs (2009). 
In an incomplete and unpublished13 response to Zeitoun and Warner’s 2006 publication, 
Selby criticizes the Hydro-hegemony framework based on two conceptual weaknesses.
Firstly, Zeitoun and Warner draw a conceptual line between dominance and hegemony. Selby 
(2007) posits that they do not clarify whether dominance is in fact the opposite of hegemony, 
since it is based on coercion, or whether it is a facet of hegemony. Based on the tactics 
available to a hydro-hegemon, it would appear that dominance is a facet but the very 
definition of hegemony as the consolidated control beyond coercion is at odds with this 
interpretation. For the purpose of this study, the function that hydro-hegemony fulfils, namely 
the consolidated control over water resources, is more important than its exact definition. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of clarification, it is necessary to state that coercive measures 
alone are insufficient to achieve consolidated control over transboundary water resources. 
Only in conjunction with non-coercive tactics do coercive measures result in successful 
control mechanisms.
Selby’s second criticism directed at the Hydro-hegemony framework mirrors ongoing 
positivist vs. post-positivist discussions in IR literature. According to Brown (2006), as well 
as Dunne and Schmidt (2008), the benchmark definition of state power has long been set by 
positivist realist theorists who continue to dominate mainstream IR theory. According to 
realist scholars, anarchy governs the international system and is moderated only by state 
power (Keohane, 1984). Although the distribution of material capabilities establishes a 
balance of power, it can never change the underlying anarchic systemic structure. The self-
help principle leads to situation where states are mainly concerned about their own survival. 
War is thus a constant feature of international relations (Carr, 1939; Morgenthau, 1978; 
Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 2002). Realism assumes absolute territorial sovereignty, division 
between domestic and foreign politics, and “the state as prior to and a container of society” 
(Agnew, 1994: 54). 
Realist assumptions have been contested by various schools of thought. The crucial 
difference between positivist and post-positivist understanding of IR is about the constructed 
13Confirmed in a personal e-mail by Mr. Selby 
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nature of knowledge (Jacobs, 2009: 34). For positivist theorists knowledge of state, borders, 
and war is an empirical reality, regardless of time and space. By contrast, critical theorists 
consider these malleable ‘facts’ as derived from the state/society complex (Cox, 1987). 
Robert Cox, one of the chief critics of critical IR theory, declares that 
Neorealism puts the accent on states reduced to their dimension of material force 
and similarly reduces the structure of world order to the balance of power as a 
configuration of material forces (1987: 102). 
Much of the literature on hydropolitics has been described as ‘reactionary’, precisely because 
it is caught in the territorial trap, namely unquestioning acceptance of current political state 
boundaries (Jacobs, 2009: 18). Instead of creating its own level of analysis it emulates 
mainstream IR theory.
This criticism of the hydropolitical literature also applies to the Hydro-hegemony framework. 
Selby notes that despite their neo-Gramscian claims, Zeitoun and Warner’s framework is 
premised on a state-centric worldview; referring only to the inter-national aspects of 
hydropolitics “and in doing so ignoring both its national and trans-national dimension” (2007: 
2). Selby notes that in the Hydro-hegemony framework, ‘hegemons’ are always states, the 
results are only felt by states and conflicts are between state actors. He applies the above-
mentioned post-positivist criticisms to the Hydro-hegemony framework. His criticism is 
based on empirical evidence found in hydropolitical complexes and the era of globalisation 
in general. 
The mainstream realist distinction between an anarchic world order and a stable national 
environment does not reflect the empirical reality of East Africa (Selby, 2007). Particularly in 
post-colonial Africa, observers have pointed out the arbitrary nature of territorial states 
(Selby, 2007). Integration of economic production and political structures shape East Africa’s 
present and future; the fast-tracked integration of the EAC being only one example of eroding 
national sovereignty which positivists are unable to address adequately. Additionally, 
Clapham argues that many governments in Sub-Saharan Africa are indistinguishable from so-
called rebel movements, the only difference being that state governments are recognized by 
the UN (1998). Furthermore, genocide, repression and civil war – all features of the East 
African political landscape − form part of the state formation process following 
independence. These arguments therefore require researchers to go Beyond Hydro-Hegemony
(Selby, 2007).
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Other authors like Giordano and Wolf also criticize the Hydro-hegemony framework from a 
more environmentalist perspective (2002). Because water is by its nature fluid and non-static, 
a realist perspective cannot explain the processes taking place on transboundary waterways. 
The Nile water flow varies significantly from season to season and changes course in 
unpredictable ways. Although geographic factors, like the continued water flow, are usually 
considered to be a given, the Nile River challenges these ‘static facts’, for example through 
high water flow variations.
Burchill posits that “a single theory cannot, by itself, completely identify and explain all the 
key structures and dynamics in the international system” (1996: 22). Taking heed of the 
criticism against Realism, this study expands the Hydro-hegemony framework by applying it 
to the regional level of analysis. To recapture, the criticism included chiefly the state-centric 
approach to IR and the resulting anarchic world order that follows. 
The criticism against the scale of conflict and cooperation is directed against its neo-realist /
liberal assumption of an essentially anarchic world order. At the extreme conflictual end of 
the spectrum this is reflected in a Water War perspective while at the cooperation side, a neo-
Liberal institutionalist perspective keeps potential warfare at bay. Jacobs objects that this 
portrayal of water resource events limits the options to two results − war or institutional 
cooperation (2009). Different degrees of cooperation and conflict may exist simultaneously 
over various issues regarding transboundary water resources (Allan, 2000). “The type of 
cooperative strategy negotiated should therefore be unique to a particular context” (Jacobs, 
2009: 33). Negotiators and policy-makers should take her criticism into consideration when 
approaching transboundary watercourse policy in the future. 
2.6 Justification for a Regional Analysis of East Africa
Conventionally, as mentioned before, political scientists consider the state to be the unit of 
analysis (Gerring, 2007: 19). The five states that are situated in the LVB are actors with a 
degree of agency within the unit itself, but they are not the subject of the present analysis. 
There are five primary reasons as to why this study uses a regional analysis. 
Firstly, the colonial Scramble for Africa resulted in state boundaries which were meant to 
benefit the colonial powers and yet, they have remained in place and are still being 
maintained today. More importantly, the Europeans were unfamiliar with the region and 
relied on geographic features and latitudes in demarcating the boundaries of territories. Yet 
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mountain ranges were often larger than expected and fell between two spheres of influence, 
so that new disputes would arise. The 30°E meridian was used as a demarcation but on the 
ground it was harder to measure than on the map. In their Scramble for Africa the rivalry 
between European states sometimes led to grotesque forms of land division as is exemplified 
in present-day Rwanda and Burundi. 
The Berlin Conference (1884) assigned Ruanda-Urundi to German East Africa (Deutsch 
Ostafrika) alongside Tanganyika (now Tanzania). Yet it took another eight years before the 
first European ever set foot in the territory. Only in 1892 did Oscar Baumann map the 
territory for the first time, at the same time informing the reigning king that his territory had 
been under German governance for eight years already (Kigali Memorial Centre, 2011; 
Chrétien, 1968: 55). At Berlin, borders were drawn up based on sketchy geographical 
knowledge and due to the “hegemony of linear boundaries” (Médard, 2009: 276) and neither 
geographic nor demographic realities were deemed significant. The Nile River was used to 
separate regions under colonial administration, even if the kingdoms’ borders originally did 
not reach the banks of the Nile (Médard, 2009: 276). While this is an example of the absurd 
situations which shape the continent until today, 
not all the boundaries of Eastern Africa were arbitrarily drawn. Detailed 
surveying was used to define some boundaries, and there are some cases were 
considerable efforts were made to avoid dividing communities or to guarantee 
rights to water (…). (Okumu, 2010: 285).
In a few cases, local communities were able to petition the colonial administration over 
territory. This was the case in 1924 when a petition by the Kissaka district population to the 
Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations led to the integration of this 
district into Rwanda. However, where the colonial administrative bodies had strategic 
interests, the local populations were ignored (Okumu, 2010: 285). The British ‘obsession’ to 
control the Nile resources had a large effect on the borders of Tanzania-Kenya-Rwanda-
Uganda (Okumu, 2010: 282) and Lake Victoria is divided as a result of this. Indeed, the 
British paid meticulous attention to the exploration and mapping of the LVB under the 
Colonial Survey Committee. Nevertheless, in more far-flung places where few or no British 
interests prevailed, the colonial administration had no need to survey the land and maps were 
highly inaccurate until the late 1950s when East African states became independent and 
knowing the exact border of the newly sovereign country became a political priority. The 
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artificial and imperial boundaries that continue to define East African borders highlight the 
fact that state borders are essentially, and specifically in East Africa, rooted in British 
colonial interests.
Unfortunately, besides its British colonial past, East Africa also shares a history of 
regionalised conflicts. The region as whole has been defined by civil conflicts since 
independence. In the 1960s massacres took place in Rwanda and Zaire, now the DRC, and 
during the 1970s violent clashes spead across Burundi and Uganda, which continued into the 
1980s and culminated in the proxy wars in the 1990s across the region (Médard, 2009: 278). 
Probably the most infamous of these conflicts was the Rwandan genocide which is closely 
linked to unrest in Burundi and the continued violence in the eastern part of the DRC. In 
course of the DRC violent conflict the Eastern Congolese territory became a threat to 
Ugandan domestic security. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) traversed freely between the 
countries and eventually the Ugandan government ‘invaded’ the DRC’s sovereign territory. 
Médard  points out that this was actually a reinstatement of an ancient Ugandan ‘frontier’
(2009: 279). 
These interconnected conflicts are often cited as examples of Buzan’s Regional Security 
Complex theory (RSCT) (Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan & Waever, 2003). 
According to Buzan, the term ‘security complex’ refers to the interdependence of both shared 
and competing interests and reflects the shifting patterns of conflict and cooperation over 
time (Buzan & Waever, 2003: 81). In addition to perceived amity and enmities, the security
complex binds states together into an RSC. The Great Lakes region has long been “convulsed 
with genocide, civil wars14, inter-state conflict and flawed democratic transition” (Lunn, 
2006: 1). More than its shared colonial history, what shows that East Africa is indeed a 
regional complex is its growing institutional regionalism and dependence on the 
neighbouring countries for domestic security. On the micro level, porous borders have 
allowed rebel groups (or freedom fighters), refugee flows and traders to walk back and forth 
between countries, undetected by the state. Other common security concerns are cattle 
rustling, drug trafficking, human trafficking, gun smuggling, and auto theft which feature in 
the economies of the border areas (Okumu, 2010: 280). 
14In this dissertation armed conflicts are defined as less than 1000 battle-related deaths per year, while wars 
claim more than 1000 lives per annum (UCDP, 2013).
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The overwhelming intersubjective understanding in the media and in international 
organisations of states as the international actors is only slowly being replaced by a more 
diversified arena of actors – regional actors like the EAC Secretariat and well-known NGOs, 
like Doctors without borders. Constructivist scholars are challenging these notions. On the 
radical side of the constructivist spectrum, Kratochwil (2000) disregards the claim ’scientific 
realism’ and does not accept state borders as a reality even to the slightest degree. Most 
constructivists are located in the middle and accept a degree of ‘minimal foundationalism’, so 
that 
most Constructivists argue that consensual standards (i.e. generally accepted 
norms and values) must govern the derivation of plausible interpretations of 
social reality (Jacobs, 2009: 59). 
This study also accepts the premises of minimal foundationalism of the intersubjective 
understanding of states as “self-organising units to which it is possible to attribute identities 
and interests” (Jacobs, 2009: 59). 
As was shown above, the state, and particularly ‘nationalism’, is artificial constructed, or an 
Imagined Community (Anderson, 1983). Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where the 
colonial powers imposed borders, the state is fluid and borders porous. Ethnic groups and 
clans sit on both sides of the border and often the line in the sand that is the official border is 
not reflected in local realities. 
Based on the above argument, Africanist critics argue that due to its state-centric and 
structure-oriented conceptual foundations, mainstream IR theory is not applicable to Africa 
(Brown, 2006: 121). Brown (2006: 123) cautions against using IR theory as an exact 
reflection of reality and reminds researchers that it is merely a framework. At the most basic, 
IR is about “relations between politically-organised societies” (Brown, 2006: 125) which 
opens the international system up to a whole array of actors. States control their territory and 
the monopoly of power to varying degrees but they represent a form of political organisation, 
also in sub-Saharan Africa (Brown, 2006: 133). Brown argues that taking the state out of 
political analysis also means taking agency away from post-colonial African states (2006: 
128). In 1964 African leaders, after all, decided to adopt Resolution A/Res. 16(1) which 
states that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) member states “respect the borders 
existing on the achievement of national independence”. This sentiment was confirmed by the 
African Union (AU) in their Constitutive Act which became effective in 2001. 
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In the case of East Africa, the intersubjective understanding of statehood seems twofold; de 
facto and de jure. In the case of the Republic of South Sudan, independence from Sudan 
followed decades of intrastate conflict. In January 2011 a referendum was held, in which over 
98% of Southern Sudanese supported the notion of an independent state. On the 9th of July 
the official independence ceremony took place, enshrining the de facto government. Three 
days later, the UN General Assembly welcomed South Sudan as 193rd Member State, 
confirming its de jure statehood as South Sudan was welcomed with the words 
Today we are firmly entrenching South Sudan in the community of nations in the
same way as other Member States with the same rights and responsibilities (UN 
General Assembly President, Mr. Deiss, 09.07.2011). 
Statehood and sovereignty clearly matter to the Southern Sudanese people. The state should 
neither be disregarded as a unit of analysis, nor should it remain the automatic level of 
analysis. The challenge of balancing national sovereignty and hydro-interdependence is 
exacerbated by the imposition of international borders in river basins which 
generate a sharp disconnect between the politically constructed notion of 
sovereignty and the physical hydrology of rivers (Alam et al, 2011: 426).
In case of the LVB the regional, as opposed to state-based, analysis is necessary to give 
account of resource distribution policies. A case study that would focus on, for example, 
Uganda would miss out on the larger regional picture because
the specificity of this region has (…) to do with (…) a common cultural 
background of neighbouring societies. The region was culturally related and yet 
politically divided for centuries (Médard, 2009: 278). 
Under the EAC, the region is now growing together as “One People, One Destiny”. If states 
are “obvious social and political constructs, making use of language, culture, identity and 
geographical landmarks” (Médard, 2009: 281) to create common identities, then so could a 
region. Similar dances, Kiswahili as lingua franca, and other common cultural goods are 
prevalent throughout East Africa. The EAC pays tribute to this shared cultural connection and 
brings the communities of the five Partner States together. 
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The EAC’s Protocol of Sustainable Development of the Lake Victoria Basin from 2003 
furthermore shows that the EAC, in addition to paying tribute to the common historical and 
cultural factors, also governs shared resources, specifically Lake Victoria. 
Yohannes makes the compelling argument that most IR theory treats the environment as a 
separate sphere and, at most, pays lip service to it. States and regional organisations are 
considered agents and nature open to be endlessly exploited (2009: 77). Consequently, the 
environment, and especially freshwater biodiversity, is sacrificed for economic development 
(Giordano & Wolf, 2003). Yohannes argues that in hydropolitics this needs to change. The 
environment is an integral part of the analysis and possible solutions hinge on its limited 
availability (Yohannes, 2009). For the purpose of analysing hydropolitics, the environmental 
resources limit economic development. As part of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) water has been recognized as a major inhibitor of economic and social development 
since 2000. This is maybe the strongest argument outside the theoretical IR realm that 
compels researchers to consider hydropolitics on a larger scale.
Lastly, and not to be neglected in a hydropolitical analysis, the East African countries are 
united by a shared ecosystem. Although rivers can both separate and unite regions (Médard, 
2009: 276), the riparian states are united in a “complex hydrological feedback loop” (Alam et 
al., 2011: 425). The Nile River, like all rivers, consists of more than the visible surface water. 
The tributary waterways which contribute to the water flow are often rivers in their own right, 
such as the Kagera River15 which feeds Lake Victoria and is considered the most upstream 
tributary of the Nile River. In total, this water system of surface and groundwater is called the 
NRB and is a much larger area than the Nile River itself. Geographically speaking a river 
basin is a 
topographically delineated area drained by a stream system that is, the total land 
area above some point ... [including] the entire river and its tributaries (Gleditsch 
et al., 2006: 366). 
The extent and cross-border reach of the LVB is illustrated in Map 1.4 (page 11).
15The Kagera Basin Organisation (KBO) consisted of Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda but was dissolute 
in 2004 (Jacobs, 2009).
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A watercourse is defined as a “system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by 
virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common 
terminus” (UN Draft Convention 1997: Article 2). The UN’s 1997 Draft Convention on the 
Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourse (henceforth 1997 Draft 
Convention) also recognises that international watercourses are situated in different states. It 
is a geographic definition of the term which has been codified by the 1997 Draft Convention. 
The definition of a watercourse closely resembles the definition of a basin in geographical 
terms. However, “The basin is frequently used as a spatial unit for socio-economic 
management” (Gleditsch et al., 2006: 366). In other words, river basins have more than a 
geographic aspect; they also serve as analytical spaces. Basin and sub-basins form their own 
socio-economic units and watercourses but are connected: 
Surface water flows across basins and sub-basins unite areas by providing common 
water sources, aquatic habitats, transportation networks, quality water, hydropower 
potential and other shared goods and services (UNEP, 2010: 37). 
Rivers can separate by posing obstacles to human mobility and communication. For example, 
the Nile confined the conflict between the Ugandan government and the LRA to northern 
Uganda because the LRA was incapable of crossing the river and thus carrying the conflict 
South (Médard, 2009: 276). More subtly, however, transboundary water resources unite the 
peoples, species and plants living in one interdependent, often invisible, ecosystem.
2.7 The Theoretical Framework
The chapter began with an overview of hydropolitics in IR and two discussions, namely of 
interstate water wars and cooperation, emerged from the hydropolitical literature review. 
Depending on the author, it is argued that water scarcity may lead to either interstate conflict 
or cooperation. Since empirical data, from several authors, does not support the simplistic 
assumption that water scarcity equals violent war, it has been argued that the cooperation 
paradigm provides a more useful framework of analysis on transboundary watercourses. This 
led researchers to delve into the best way to encourage cooperation between states to create 
win-win situations, whereby water scarcity would not be compounded by competing national 
interests. The foremost mechanism that emerged was the liberal institutionalisation of water 
governance, in the form of treaties and basin-wide organisations. Additionally, at the end of 
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the last decade, some authors have started to criticize the overall positivist approach in the 
hydropolitical literature, based on its state-centric and anarchic epistemological assumptions. 
The other conclusion that can be drawn from the literature review is that the positivist 
analysis of hydropolitics is no longer viable. Academics in the field of IR have discussed the 
merits and demerits of a state-centric analysis exhaustively and it seems that, like the other 
levels of analyses, it depends on the subject of analysis and the relevance of the subject under 
discussion. Specifically in East Africa, the regional level of analysis seems much more 
appropriate due to political, environmental, and historical factors. 
The second conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion is that access to water and 
control over transboundary water resources largely hinges on relative power indicators. These 
have been derived from the influential Antonio Gramsci that laid the foundation for power 
analysis based on coercive (non-action) and consensual (actualised behaviour) control tactics 
and strategies. The LWRG has transferred these meanings to the basin level. The ultimate 
expression of power is in form of the hydro-hegemon who has consolidated control over 
transboundary watercourses through relatively greater power (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). 
From Ana Cascao’s work, it was extrapolated that hydro-hegemony must not be uncontested 
(2008). Non-hegemons apply reactive and active strategies in the effort to change the status 
quo. Undermining the hydro-hegemon’s legitimacy, mobilising funds and actively pursuing 
diplomatic means to change the current regime, are just some of the strategies which will be 
analysed for the East African region.
The present chapter has established the conceptual pillars of this study, which will be used in 
the next chapter, where the Egyptian hydro-hegemonic position will be described, and East 
Africa counter-hydro-hegemonic strategies will be outlined.
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CHAPTER 3: POWER SHIFTS
The third chapter provides a detailed account of the changing East African power relationship 
vis á vis Egypt. The status quo is easily discerned and has repeatedly been described in 
hydropolitical research. Researchers agree that Egypt controls the Nile’s water resources and 
that it is by far the most powerful actor in the basin. Privileged access to funding in the World 
Bank, the early use of treaties, like the bilateral 1959 Agreement with Sudan, and other 
factors have put it in a very powerful position indeed. Against Egypt’s consolidated control, 
or hydro-hegemony, the situation in the Nile River is defined by an asymmetrical power 
relationship between upstream and downstream riparian states, in which the upstream states 
are characterized by relatively weaker power. 
Cascao explains how this lack of power and power asymmetries come about:
Asymmetries of power arise from the lack of internal political and economic 
stability, the lack of international support and funding, relatively larger 
knowledge gaps, weak expertise, institutional and negotiating capacity. 
Asymmetric levels of expertise are decisive in decision-making process as they 
inﬂuence negotiation and bargaining procedures, as well as the implementation 
and monitoring of projects. (2008: 20). 
What she describes are essentially the pillars of hydro-hegemony, depicted in Figure 2.1 
(page 26), namely Egypt’s riparian position, potential exploitation and political power 
indicators. These pillars also structure this chapter’s description of changing power relations 
in the Nile. 
The chapter begins by outlining the relative riparian positions of East Africa and Egypt 
which, combined with Egypt’s high dependency on the Nile, illustrate the point that 
manmade indicators, not geography, determine where the water flows to. This outline is 
followed by an analysis of structural power by way of its economic and military indicators, 
which have made Egypt much more powerful than East Africa. Considering the close link 
between a state’s financial capabilities, its own wealth and the capacity to invoke financial 
aid; and its ability to build dams, the financial assessment of Egypt and East Africa is 
followed by a discussion of the Egyptian High Aswan Dam (HAD) and the Ugandan Narube 
power plant. This is followed by the analysis of the institutional indicators and ideational 
capabilities that have propelled East Africa forward in terms of legitimately claiming access 
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to the Nile waters. The chapter concludes with the fact that over the last decade, East African 
growing economies, dam building, and successful claims to the Nile water flow, have 
increased East Africa’s relative power vis-á-vis Egypt. 
Like all hegemons, Egypt has never been all-powerful and its largest weakness is its high 
dependency on the Nile, a watercourse at the very end of which it sits. The first section of the 
chapter goes into more detail on this issue.
3.1 Riparian Position and Dependency
Overall about 224 million people live in the basin area; one quarter of Africa’s total 
population (UNEP, 2010: 73). Many of these, about 160 million, depend on the Nile’s 
resources for their livelihoods (UNEP, 2010: 74). The demand for water is likely to rise as 
rapid population growth all across the basin is predicted. The sustainable distribution of the 
finite water resources is therefore a pressing challenge on which the upstream / downstream 
dynamic has a significant influence.
There are several factors that put upstream states in a better position than downstream states. 
Firstly, common sense suggests that upstream states are in a better position to exploit the 
water resources than the downstream riparians – the quality and quantity of the water is 
better. Secondly, much of the course of the river in upstream states is in the mountains and 
thus these states have more watersheds on their territory, as well as being better suited for 
HEP projects which produce electricity most efficiently in territories with large altitude 
changes. Thirdly, pollution flows downward which means that in transboundary agreements 
on pollution decrease only the downstream state will profit, which impedes joint action 
(Scheumann et al., 2008: 27) since upstream states can free ride without suffering any 
consequences. This is also called the Tragedy of the Commons (Okoth-Owiro, 2004: 26; 
Tvedt, 2010).
According to what has just been argued and based on its riparian position (see Map 1.1 and 
1.2, page 3), one could come to the conclusion that Egypt is the least powerful state in the 
NRB. Not only is it the most downstream state of a highly populated and politically volatile 
region, Egypt also sources over 95% of its water from the Nile River, making it the most 
dependent riparian in the NRB (Swain, 2008: 204). This high dependency of the population 
and industry on the Nile is reflected in the population distribution; over 95% of the 84,5 
million Egyptians reside in the Nile Delta (Brunnée & Toope, 2002: 10). That means that 
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33% of the entire NRB population lives in only 9% of its total area, resulting in Cairo being 
among the most densely populated cities in the world. Problems of sanitation, clean water 
supply, wastewater treatment, and pollution are among the most pressing issues Egypt faces 
due to its high reliance on the Nile.
At first glance, the East African dependency on the Nile water looks very different. Lake 
Victoria is part of the African Great Lakes in the East African Rift which spreads across the 
region, decreasing the dependence on the Nile due to alternative watersheds. Three riparian 
states border Lake Victoria: Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya. Its catchment area extends into 
Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC through the Kagera River Basin (LVFO, 2012). East Africa 
seems to have a powerful geographic advantage over Egypt. Not only is it less dependent 
than Egypt on the Nile due to its upstream position, but East Africa is also potentially able to 
decrease the quality and quantity of Egypt’s water supply. 
However, the dependency on and contribution to the Nile of individual states vary greatly 
within East Africa. At one extreme is Uganda, which lies almost entirely in the Nile’s basin 
area, a claim no other riparian state can make (Waterbury, 2002: 158). That means every 
raindrop that falls in Uganda is technically in the Nile drainage area, i.e. Nile water. At the 
other extreme is Rwanda, which has abundant rainfall and is only connected to the Nile basin 
through the Kagera River which is Lake Victoria’s largest tributary. Although Rwanda’s total 
land area is just over 2,5 million hectares it has over twelve wetlands, diversifying its water 
resources considerably. At the same time, Rwanda has one of the highest population densities 
in the world. 
The amount of water available for each person in the LVB is far below the global average 
and declining (UNEP, 2007: 74). In addition to an already high population density showing 
an upward trend, poor infrastructure, and few water storage capabilities add to water scarcity 
(UNEP, 2010). Water scarcity is commonly defined as less than 1.000 m³ per person. By this 
measure, Burundi, Kenya and Rwanda have been suffering from water scarcity since 2002 
and are to be joined by Tanzania and Uganda in 2050, if current population growth remains 
constant (Brunnée & Toope, 2002: 10). Egypt, despite its arid conditions, is not considered 
water scarce yet, although predictions suggest that in 2025 the water demand will have 
outgrown the water supply (Brunnée & Toope, 2002: 10). Urban centres especially grow 
rapidly and require freshwater for basic sanitation and food security (UNESCO et al., n.d.). 
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At the moment, Lake Victoria supplies five major urban centres with water: Kisumu, 
Kampala, Bukoba, Mwanza, and Musoma, which add up to approximately five million 
people (Okonga, 2010). The pressure on the EAC to develop new sources of freshwater for 
irrigation and sanitation purposes is unlikely to disappear any time soon. The LVB has the 
most populated and fastest growing population in East Africa as is illustrated in the Map 3.1 
on population increase in the LVB below. 
Map 3.1: Population increase in the LVB (UNEP, 2010: 73)
Outside the immediate basin area, however, Egypt’s position on the Suez Canal, proximity to 
the Mediterranean Sea and Israel has provided Egypt with a strategic advantage. Important 
trade posts have been located in Egypt since ancient time, around 3150BC, as it bridges the 
ridge between Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Since 2001, Egypt has become a key actor 
in the Middle East as ally to the United States in its War on Terror.
In contrast, East Africa has been marginalised from global trade routes precisely because of 
its geographic position (Cascao, 2009: 248). Out of the five East African states in this study, 
only two, Kenya and Tanzania, have access to the Indian Ocean while the others are 
landlocked and often lie in mountainous terrain with inadequate infrastructure, making the 
transport of goods difficult. It could be argued that strategic interests of the international 
community in East Africa have largely been about its primary resources, not about its people. 
Strategic interest in the region started with territorial gains for colonial administrations and 
proceeded through proxy wars during the Cold War to the more recent the large-scale 
acquisition of irrigation land (see Section 4.2, page 76). The failure of the international 
community to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994 seems to augment this line of argument. 
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The question arises what the population size and geographic position of states have to do with 
the power to control the Nile. Firstly, from the data it can be discerned that competition over 
the resource will become fiercer on the basin and local level. In Kenya over the last ten years, 
ethnic clashes over waterholes have led to about 500 people being killed (IPS, 2012). The 
ability to control the distribution of water resources will become more important in the future. 
Secondly, although Egypt lies at the most downstream end of the Nile and is most dependent 
on the resource, it utilises most of the water and has the ability to control the water flow. This
position of hydro-hegemony, as will be shown below, it has mainly achieved through 
relatively greater power. East Africa, in contrast, although ideally located to control the 
quality and quantity of the Nile, yet is unable to develop its own water resouces (see below). 
As Figure 2.1 (page 26) depicts, the riparian position is a pillar of hydro-hegemony but is far 
from being the most relevant indicator of control in a transboundary river basin. As will be 
shown in the next section, 
3.2 Material Power 
Egypt commands the largest material capabilities in the form of military and economic 
capabilities, as well as commanding the most advanced hydrological infrastructure. Over the 
last decade, however, East African states have been growing economically as a trade bloc and 
have been aspiring to further regional economic integration. This has also meant that East 
Africa’s military capabilities have increased, although they are still dwarfed by Egypt. 
However, it remains important to note that East Africa continues to be one of the poorest 
regions in the world with inadequate access to drinking water and basic sanitation. It will be 
argued that, though East Africa continues to suffer from structural economic weaknesses, the 
potential to develop its economy and hydro-infrastructure is challenging Egypt’s leadership 
in the pillar of material power. 
3.2.1 Economic Indicators
Economic capabilities are routinely measured though the state’s GDP. A country’s GDP is 
the sum of all goods and services produced in one year within a country (including the 
production of foreign firms), i.e. it is the total national annual output (World Bank, 2012). In 
case of the NRB, the indicators of economic prowess are very much skewed towards Egypt as 
its GDP at over US$ 229,5 billion (at current prices) (World Bank, 2012) is roughly double 
that of all the EAC Partner States taken together. In comparison, the EAC’s total GDP (at 
Stellenbosch Univeristy  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
current prices) amounted to only US$ 82,8 billion in 2011 (WorldBank, 2012). Essentially, 
Egypt produces more and is consequently richer, which, as will be shown later on, has meant 
it can embark on large-scale hydro-infrastructure projects. Egypt has proven the anonymous 
quote: “Water flows uphill towards money” as it has managed to surmount the restrictions 
little rainfall place on economic growth and has developed by far the largest economy of all 
the riparian states.
Still, times are changing. Egypt’s real GDP growth rate16 plummeted to 1,8% in 2011. In 
contrast, the EAC Partner States’ economies, despite external shocks like the global 
economic crisis, have grown considerably (World Bank, 2012). While Rwanda and Tanzania 
have had a real GDP growth of 7.5% and 7%, respectively for several years running (EAC, 
2011b: 28), Burundi, which has the slowest growing economy in the region, is still at 4,2% 
real GDP growth. However, if one considers how much larger Egypt’s economy is than those
of the EAC Partner states, it will take a while before East Africa has caught up. 
The agricultural sector is by far the largest contributor to East Africa’s economic output and 
employment (see Figure 3.1, page 51). However, there is a mismatch between the number of 
people employed in the sector and the amount of output produced. Figure 3.1 (page 51) 
makes it clear that Egypt’s agricultural sector is more efficient than those of the East African 
countries in the sense that the sector generates 14% of the GDP and employs 30% of the total 
employed people (Tadesse, 2008). In contrast, in Burundi the gap between output and the 
number of people working in the agricultural sector is extremely large; the agricultural sector 
employs 90% of the population but generates merely 35% of the GDP (FAO, 2008; ILO, 
2012). This is the result of many small-scale farm plots. The wider the gap between the 
percentage of the total employed and the percentage of the GDP, the less efficiently the 
economy is managed as many people work in a sector that actually produces comparatively 
little. 
16 “Percentage change of real GDP compared to previous year. Real GDP is adjusted for inflation” (World Bank, 
2012)
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Figure 3.1: Water and Economy
The economic inefficiency of the East African states is emphasised when one considers that 
about 71% of the water withdrawn in the Eastern Nile basin is used in the agricultural sector,
which is defined by small-scale farmers.17 However, inefficient use of a large percentage of 
water from the Nile in agriculture is not limited to these states. In Egypt, despite its much 
larger industrial sector, 86% of the water withdrawals get pumped into the agricultural sector 
(WRI, 1998 in El-Din Amer et al, 2005: 7). Although Egypt’s agricultural sector barely 
makes up 15% of its GDP, it uses close to 90% of Egypt’s Nile withdrawals, which makes up 
95% of the Nile’s utilization. This fact shapes the discussion on Egypt’s legitimate access to 
the Nile, although, as has been stated, this skewed and highly inefficient water usage is 
prevalent throughout the basin and not solely an Egyptian challenge. Uganda handles the 
nexus between water, agriculture, economic output, and employment most efficiently (see 
Figure 3.1, page 51). As the situation currently stands, the inefficient usage of water in the 
NRB leads to a bottleneck in agricultural output since the amount of potentially irrigable land 
outstrips the amount of water available (El-Din Amer, 2005: 7).
17 The rest of the water flows to the municipal (22%) and industrial (7%) sectors (UNEP, 2010).
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Experts assume that overall the Nile’s water resources provide the livelihood for around 160 
million people (UNEP, 2010: 73), most notably by means of fishing. Lake Victoria is the 
most productive freshwater fishery in the world and yields 800,000-1,000,000 tonnes of fish a 
year, most of which, 75%, goes into the local market (LVFO, 2012). According to the LVFO, 
two million people live off the fishing industry and the Lake covers about 22 million peoples’ 
fish consumption needs. Fishing contributes 25% of the LVB’s GDP. Due to its centrality in 
the regional economy and its economic growth potential the EAC has declared the LVB an 
economic growth zone, building on previous experience that decreasing intra-regional tariffs 
increases the volume of trade.
In 2004-2009 the EAC intra-regional trade increased by over 40% (EAC e-Newsletter, 2009). 
“broaden[ing] prospects for economic growth and development” (EAC, 2011a). Another 
economic opportunity for the region is the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between 
the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) and the EAC. The COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite was 
supposed to come into effect in January 2012 and is setting up a Secretariat at the time of 
writing (COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite website, 2012). Estimates show that the 26 
COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Member States, due to diminished trade barriers and tariffs, 
have increased their trade volume by more than 300% from 2002 - 2008 already (Granit et 
al., 2010). 
These growth numbers, however, cannot hide the fact that East Africa is one of the poorest 
regions in the world, even compared to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. The average per capita 
income in the LVB is 40% less than in the rest of the continent (LVBC, 2008: 2). With the 
exception of Kenya, all EAC Partner States are ranked among the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs)18. The data from these overall country indicators are mirrored by the 
Multidimensional Poverty Indicator (MDI) which takes both the intensity and incidences of 
poverty into account (Alkire & Santos, 2010). The East African indexes vary from country to 
country but the average for East Africa, 0,4 out of 1, indicates high levels and intensity of 
poverty. 
18 LDCs are measured, by the UN, according to three indicators; low income, the Human Assets Index, and the 
Economic Vulnerability Index (UN-OHRLLS, 2013).
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The interplay of poverty, health and water has long been acknowledged and the seventh 
MDG links halving poverty by 2015 to “sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic 
sanitation” (MDG Target 7.C). In the most recent MDG Progress Report (2011), it clearly 
states that Africa will not meet Target 7.C if progress continues to be as insufficient as it is at 
present. In four African countries the trend is in fact retrogressive and three of those are Nile 
riparians, namely Rwanda, Sudan, and Tanzania (UNDP, 2011)19. In these countries water is 
being more unequally distributed between rural and urban, as well as rich and poor 
populations than was previously the case. 
The research presented in this section showed that Egypt is currently the "clear hegemon on 
the Nile in terms of economic strength" (Whittington, 2004: 2). However, as this study has 
also shown, and a fact many other hydropolitical researchers have missed, the water is not 
efficiently distributed in the Egyptian economy. Since the agricultural sector is the greatest 
user of water by far, more extremely fluctuating water flow endangers it and by extension 
Egypt’s food security. It is unlikely that the sector would be able to cope with less water. 
Structurally embedded economic problems in East Africa, like too little diversification and an 
overreliance on agriculture as most of the population remains dependent on subsistence 
agriculture, have prevented the economic development for the poorest thus far. The regional 
economic organisations offer countries the opportunity for a more diversified economy. As of 
now, however, East Africa’s economic capabilities are dwarfed by Egypt’s output, making 
Egypt relatively more powerful.
3.2.2 Military Capabilities
The relative wealth Egypt has acquired has meant its spending on military capabilities has 
been significantly higher than that of East Africa. Egypt’s military sector is larger and better 
equipped than that of East African states. Its defence expenditure amounted to US$ 4107 
million in 2011. The East African country with the next highest defence expenditure is Kenya 
with US$ 507 million (SIPRI, 2012). 
Though mainly directed at Ethiopia, threats over upstream water utilization, by high-ranking 
Egyptian officials over the years gives particular weight to the importance of a military 
balance in the basin. The military strength of Egypt, relative to the other riparian states, could 
be one answer as to how Egypt has consolidated control over the Nile. 
19 The fourth one is Algeria (UNDP, 2011).
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But East Africa is catching up. Even though other regionalised conflicts have subsided over 
the last decade, Somalia’s instability threatens the region’s security. Consequently East 
African states have increased their military expenditures, so much so that The East African
newspaper ran a headline: “EA’s [East Africa’s] quiet arms race” (Onyango-Obbo, 2011).
In the article to which the headline refers, the journalist Onyango-Obbo points out how the 
UN and AU policy of reimbursing states that dispatch troops for peacekeeping missions has 
inadvertently funded several Ugandan fighter jets (Onyango-Obbo, 2011: 9). The fighter jets 
made a considerable addition to the military power of East Africa and shift “the region’s 
military balance (....) forever” (Onyango-Obbo, 2011: 1). The author also points out that 
those East African states which have recently come out of a conflict, Burundi, the DRC, 
Rwanda, and Uganda, have large contingencies of troops since insurgents are being 
integrated into the respective national army structures. 
In other words, as civil conflicts abate East Africa’s military power is growing and becoming 
more streamlined into professional armies. In Egypt, on the other hand, the 2011 Arab Spring 
shifted the country’s military focus to secure domestic stability, away from the Nile. But 
Egypt is becoming more stable after the first democratic election in June 2012. In summary, 
the military dimension remains an important factor in the NRB if competition over water 
increases, with Egypt, as is expected from the hydro-hegemon, still being the leading military 
power.
3.3 Exploitation Potential
According to the Hydro-hegemony framework, the exploitation potential of riparians is, in 
addition to material, institutional and ideational power, a pillar of hegemonic consolidated 
control over the transboundary water flow. This study, like most researchers, will focus on 
the physical infrastructure, namely dams, as the main indicator of the exploitation potential of 
water resources. The reason dams are considered crucial in hydropolitical analyses is their 
double function as both HEP suppliers through turbines and large-scale water storage 
facilities. A dam allows for storing surface water and thus evening out seasonal variations of 
the water flow. The high water levels from the rainy season are slowly released during the 
dry months, allowing year round agricultural production. These two functions make dams a 
powerful political tool; therefore they tend to be prioritized by governments, who want to 
give citizens the impression that they are managing ‘our’ water (Alam et al, 2011: 427). 
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Dams are the ultimate expression of controlling the water flow and hence important 
indicators of changing power relations.
Governments’ ability to realize large-scale infrastructure projects, like dams, depends on their 
riparian location and relative power vis-à-vis other riparian states in the basin (Alam et al, 
2011: 427). The asymmetrical technical control over the Nile water flow is rooted in the 
British colonial aspirations and the “patterns for competition and quest for control [of the 
Nile] were subsequently replicated” (Brunnée & Toope, 2002: 12) and are still discernible 
today.
As the colonial power in all of the riparian states discussed here, Great Britain went to 
considerable lengths to ensure that its upstream colonies did not take away from Egypt’s 
water supply. From the start, British colonial ambitions along the Nile were marked by the 
decision to control the Nile, mostly due to the importance of the Suez Canal which provided
the crucial lifeline to Britain’s Eastern Empire (Layne, 1994). Additionally, Great Britain’s 
interest in Egypt’s water supply has also been linked to its interest in the production of the 
cotton fields in Egypt (IPS, 2012). Part of the strategy Britain used to control the Nile were 
legal agreements with other colonial power that guaranteed that infrastructure projects along 
the course of the Nile can only be constructed with Egypt’s approval (Brunnée & Toope, 
2002: 14). 
Following the ascendances of President Nasser to power in 1954, the Egyptian government 
addressed the issue of water security, also based on their experience in the Suez War with the 
British in 1956. Newly emerged national confidence led to radical water securing policies, 
leading to the signing of the 1959 Agreement and culminated in the HAD, completed in 
1970/71 and financed by the Soviet government. The issue of water security for Egypt was 
then cemented in the bilateral 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan which granted 
Egypt the majority of the Nile’s water flow. Great Britain forfeited all claims to water on 
behalf of its upstream territory; today’s sovereign East African states. By the time HAD was 
completed, East African states had only recently gained independence20 and therefore were 
unable to undertake large infrastructural projects, so that the HAD “determined Egypt’s full 
technical control over the Nile resources” (Cascao, 2009: 247). The HAD’s storage capacity 
20 Year of independence: DRC: 1960, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda: 1962, Kenya: 1963, Tanganyka: 1964
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is, at 168km³/year, still significantly larger than that of any of the dams situated in the LVB 
(FAO, 2009).
Egypt has further expanded its physical control over the Nile water through the New Valley 
Project also called the Toshka project, in 1997. The Toshka project was perceived across the 
NRB as highly provocative. The Toshka depression diverts overflow from the HAD into the 
desert where it forms desert lakes. The Egyptian government under former President Hosni 
Mubarak conceived the plan to resettle three million inhabitants to mitigate food insecurities 
(Brunnée & Toope, 2002: 17). According to Allam et al., this project has, ironically, 
increased Egypt’s dependence on the Nile water flow (2011: 427). Whilst the HAD decreased 
seasonal vulnerabilities, the new projects have diminished Egypt’s ability to adjust to 
decadal, i.e. more long term, water flow variations. Recent press statements by the new 
Egyptian government seem to suggest that the project will go ahead as the new Prime 
Minister, Dr. Qandil, laid the foundation stone for an entirely new suburb around the artificial 
lake (Egyptian SIS, 2012).
In addition to the HAD, the Narubare plant (formerly Owen Falls Dam) is of importance in 
terms of the White Nile’s hydrological infrastructure. The Narubare plant is the largest 
upstream electricity supplying dam, situated at the outflow of the Lake Victoria to the Nile in 
Jinja, Uganda. Egypt’s dominance over the Nile becomes apparent in that the Narubare plant 
was built with British money but had to be explicitly approved, as of the 1929 Exchange of 
Notes on the Use of Waters of the Nile for Irrigation (commonly referred to as the 1929 
Agreement), by the Royal Egyptian Government in 1949 (Exchange of Notes, 1949). 
Additionally, Egyptian experts were ‘closely involved’ in the construction of the dam (Allan, 
2000: 258). 
As East African economies continue to grow, the importance and political will to build HEP 
will increase (El-Din Amer et al., 2005). According to the Ugandan Electricity Regulatory 
Authority (ERA), Uganda’s electricity demand increases by 10% annually (Baranga, 2012).
Today the lack of electricity can be felt already across the EAC. The Tanzanian electricity 
grid has 230 Megawatt (MW) too little power due to decreasing water levels in the power 
dams (Kimboy, 11.02.2011). This means the electricity outages are a daily occurrence and 
economic development now and in the future is restricted. Small and middle class businesses 
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are especially affected, since they cannot afford a generator21. At the same time, because of 
the overreliance on hydropower in the region, droughts have repeatedly led to even more 
severe power cuts across East Africa (Bosshard, 2012). This has resulted in a paradoxical 
situation, whereby the people with the least access to electricity have to pay most for it 
(Rugumire-Makuza, n.d.: 2). The Ugandan Electricity Authority approved another 47% 
average price hike for 2012 (Baranga, 2012). For this reason, East African governments are 
keen to build new electricity producing dams, regardless of the social or environmental 
impact. 
The power supply is underdeveloped throughout the entire Nile basin, since currently only 
1% of the potential is being used by all upstream riparians combined (El-Din Amer et al., 
2005: 7). However, the potential for HEP plants to produce electricity is great. Egypt, in 
contrast, has basically reached its full HEP potential (see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: Potential and Installed Hydro-electric power22 (El-Din Amer et 
al., 2005: 6)
State actor Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda Egypt
Installed
Hydro-electric 
power (MW)
810ª 2 34 337 810ª 2845
Potential
hydro-electric 
power (MW)
+120 +355 +121 +4 500 2200ª +138
ª Source: Baranga, 2012
Over the last decade, under the auspices of the NBI, East Africa has been planning and 
developing new and old dam projects. For instance, the Narubare plant was neglected under 
the leadership of Uganda’s President, Idi Amin in the 1970s, and has not worked to its full 
potential since (Allan, 2000). In 1993, instead of renovating the 180-megawatt power station, 
21The cost for a single household generator is about US$ 180 per month for petrol alone, not to mention 
maintenance costs, etc. This compares to the fact that 97% of Tanzanians earn less than US$ 2 per day (OPHI, 
2010). 
22These are the maximum capacity levels and can decrease when water levels drop, for example during the 
summer months (El-Din Amer et al., 2005: 6).
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Uganda began to construct the 200-megawatt Kiira Power Station adjacent to the old plant. In 
January 2012, Bujagali Energy Limited furthermore opened the Bujagali Hydropower Project 
which provides an additional 250MW of electricity and 388 hectare (ha) of water reservoir 
(Bujagali Energy Limited, 2012). 
The NBI is also implementing water projects in the NELSB (NBI, 2011: 10): 
i) The Rusumo Falls Hydro-electric Multipurpose Project (RRFP), shared between Tanzania, 
Rwanda and Burundi which has appeared and reappeared in planning processes since 
independence in the 1960s; 
ii) the Bugesera Integrated Water and Irrigation Project, shared between Rwanda and 
Burundi; 
iii) large-scale electrical transmission lines across the region under the Interconnection 
Project framework which distributes Southern African and East African HEP around the 
regions (Rugumire-Makuza, n.d.); and
iv) fisheries management projects in Lake Victoria’s tributaries.
There are also other sources of energy and electricity in the region: natural gas deposits have 
been found along the Kenyan and Tanzanian coastline; Uganda has discovered crude oil 
reserves in its western province, around Lake Albert; and oil-rich South Sudan has been 
invited to join the EAC by the Heads of State (The Citizen, 2011). As a result, the EAC’s 
energy future could become more diversified. It should be kept in mind, however, that both 
oil and gas extractions require substantial amounts of water.23 The water used during 
extraction becomes highly polluted and cannot be reused, unlike the water used to produce 
HEP. In order to guarantee future water quality and quantity, careful management and 
environmental impact assessments are necessary. Unsurprisingly, such management often 
does not take place or, where impact assessments have been carried out, like in Tanzania and 
Kenya when pipelines were built for the Lamu Port- South Sudan- Ethiopia, Transport and 
Economic Development Corridor (LAPSSET) project, they have been ignored. Even where 
international standard impact assessments are carried out and followed, these assessments 
23The precise amount of water needed per gallon of crude oil in petroleum production is difficult to ascertain as 
private companies are not forthcoming in publishing their data (EC JRC Workshop, 2012).
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often ignore the environmental impacts on the entire water flow (Brunnée & Toope, 2002: 
18). 
It seems sure that East Africa’s technical control over the water flow of the Nile is increasing 
through increased multilateral dam building and other hydro-infrastructure projects. Where 
Egypt, until now, has had substantially more control over the water, East Africa is emerging 
as a major player on the continent. The same trend can be observed in the next section on 
institutional capabilities where East Africa has proven itself a skilled political actor and is 
potentially able to undermine Egypt’s hydro-hegemonic position. 
3.4 Institutional Power
As was briefly alluded to in Chapter 2: “The most common form of power for countering the 
established order is bargaining power” (Zeitoun & Allan, 2008: 11). The East African 
countries have used this principle in international relations within the framework of 
international institutions. For many years Egypt was able to mobilize international and basin-
wide institutions to strengthen and maintain its hegemonic position over the Nile water by 
controlling the flow of development funds, creating favourable regimes and substantiating its 
hydro-hegemony with international treaties. However, in the recent past East Africa has been 
able to challenge Egypt on a number of issues, thus increasing its legitimate claims and 
voting power over the transboundary watercourse.
3.4.1 Financial Stalling
One crucial aspect of dam building that was not mentioned above, are the large financial 
costs. Poor countries, such as the EAC Partner States, have been unable to develop their 
water resources on a large scale due to a lack of funds. In the past, Egypt has been very 
successful in blocking upstream projects by using its political influence and taking advantage 
of the international institutional rules and regulations to block financial aid for upstream 
water infrastructure projects. An often-cited example of this process is World Bank’s 
influence on large-scale projects in the 1990s.
During the 1990’s the World Bank was the only viable source of international donor funding 
for large-scale projects. The World Bank also set the norms of project evaluation for other 
funders like the African Development Bank (AfDB). The World Bank’s Operational 
Directive 7.50 stipulates that any project must be fully explained to the fellow riparians who 
have six months to raise objections. Once this period has passed a Project Appraisal 
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Document (PAD) is prepared, making final recommendations based on: i) existing 
agreements, ii) responses from the other riparians, and iii) whether ‘possible water use’ will 
cause ‘appreciable harm’ (Pochat, n.d.: 12). The last part is most contentious; if a 
downstream riparian can allege that the proposed project is likely to cause ‘appreciable 
harm’, a poorly defined term, the World Bank will not give financial aid. Although the policy 
is meant to ensure that decisions are taken multilaterally and sustainably, it has de facto
granted downstream states like Egypt veto power over hydro-infrastructure projects. In case 
of the Nile this has meant that Egypt has blocked funding for upstream development projects 
for over two decades. 
With new financiers in the region, notably the People’s Republic of China (PRC), this de 
facto veto power of Egypt’s has come to an end. In 2007, the state-owned EXIM Bank of 
China overtook the World Bank as the largest credit agency in the world (Bosshard, 2008: 2). 
Large-scale projects, like dams, can now be constructed independently from both the World 
Bank, the AfDB and, by extension, Egypt. The PRC is hesitant to publish data on its 
international development aid but according to the NGO, International Rivers, the PRC has 
already financed two HEP projects in East Africa and nine more are being planned 
(International Rivers, 2012). 
Furthermore, it seems that the PRC finances and builds these dams where other investors 
have pulled out because the projects are in breach of international and national environmental 
laws. This state of affairs is well documented by International Rivers for the Merowe Dam in 
the Sudan (Bosshard, 2008). It seems that, in these cases, the absolute territorial sovereignty 
over water in one’s territory is of the utmost importance, not the shared or interdependent 
nature of rivers. This is unsurprising given that the PRC’s foreign policy is guided by the 
following Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence i) mutual respect for territorial integrity 
and sovereignty ii) non-aggression, iii) non-interference, iv) equality, and v) mutual benefit. 
The PRC’s investment in East Africa has meant that it can develop its hydro-infrastructure, 
regardless of Egypt’s or anybody else’s objections – a fact that the EAC Partner States have 
recognized and of which they have taken advantage in the last decade.
3.4.2 Negotiation Power
The strategic utilization of the World Bank’s policy on hydrologic funding allocation is only 
one way in which Egypt has asserted indirect control over the Nile. Through discursive and 
bargaining tools, Egypt has been able to influence the whole basin’s agenda, including 
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bilateral and multilateral political relations (Cascao, 2008). A large degree of Egypt’s power 
is rooted in institutional and legal treaties based on the already mentioned colonial power 
dynamics. On the following page is a time scale of relevant treaties, agreements, and 
institutional arrangements which have shaped the asymmetrical agenda-setting power 
capabilities of the Nile riparians. 
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1929 Nile Water 
Agreement 
(Egypt/GB for 
Sudan)
1959 Agreement for the Full 
Utilization of the Nile 
Waters (Egypt/Sudan/UK)
1967 
Hydromet
(UNDP)
1983 
Undugu
1992 
TeccoNile
1995 Nile River 
Action Plan
1993-2004 Nile 
2002 
Conference 
Series (CIDA)
1999 Establishment of 
the Nile Basin Initiative 
(NBI) (World Bank)
1906 secret tripartite agreement 
(GB/France/Italy for 
Egypt/Ethiopia) 
1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-
navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
(not ratified)
February 2011 CFA 
process complete 
(Ethiopia, Burundi, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, 
Uganda) 
1994 Convention of 
Establishment of the Lake 
Victoria Fisheries 
Organization (LVFO) 
(Tanzania/Uganda/Kenya)
2000 Treaty for the Establishment 
of the East African Community 
(Tanzania/Uganda/Kenya)
2009 East 
African 
Customs Union
launched
2003 Protocol of the 
Sustainable Development 
of the Lake Victoria Basin
2006 The Protocol on 
Environment and 
Natural resources 
Management EAC
1967-1977 The 
first EAC
Future? 
Ratification of the 
CFA? (2012)
Establishment of a 
common East 
African currency?
(2012)
2007 Rwanda and 
Burundi become full EAC 
members
Figure 3.2: Time scale of Treaties and Protocols pertaining to the Nile River Basin (assembled by t
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The first blocks (dark grey surrounded by a dotted line) are those treaties which East Africa 
had little or no influence over. For example, in 1906 the colonial powers along the NRB, 
Great Britain, Italy and France, secretly decided to guarantee the uninterrupted flow of the 
Nile to Egypt. The 1929 and 1959 Agreements between Sudan and Egypt, as well as the 1997 
UN Convention, will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.4.3 on legal capabilities.
The blocks underneath depict the institutional agreements, all of which have been 
unsuccessful in achieving their main objective, namely the allocation of Nile water to the 
riparian states. Many of the expert-driven forums, like TeccoNile, failed because they solely 
focused on the technical and scientific parts of water sharing, ignoring the complicated 
political dimension of transboundary watercourses. Allan (2000) and Waterbury (2002) argue 
that these technical institutions have actually contributed to Egypt’s hydro-hegemony. For 
example, East African states requested 5bcm of the water flow in 1961 but were refused on 
the grounds that insufficient scientific data had been provided to support the claim 
(Waterbury, 2002: 153). What constituted this ‘sufficient’ scientific data was defined by the 
Sudanese and Egyptian governments in the Permanent Joint Technical Committee (PJTC) to 
whom the application was made.
Additionally, it has been to Egypt’s advantage to insist on these basin-wide agreements. 
Egypt, as the most powerful riparian against a multitude of weaker and non-aligned states, 
could push its agenda successfully, with the further assistance of Sudan, which is bound to 
Egypt’s through the PJTC. The PJTC was agreed upon in the 1959 Agreement and obliges 
the two signatories, Egypt and Sudan, to a unanimous stance in Nile negotiations (Saleh, 
2008: 46) against a multitude of less powerful diverse states. According to Allan, this tactic 
has deliberately delayed renegotiations over water allocations (2000: 260). Burundi, Ethiopia 
and Kenya have long been aware of the unfavourable conditions of these institutions and 
refused to take part as more than mere observers. This, however, changed with the Nile Basin 
Initiative (NBI). 
The NBI is the first institution that brings all ten riparian states24 together; namely Burundi, 
the DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Eritrea as 
observer. Its vision is ‘to achieve sustainable socioeconomic development through the 
equitable utilisation of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources’ (NBI, 
24 At the time of its founding there were only ten riparian states.
Stellenbosch Univeristy  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2012). Unlike its predecessors, the NBI’s role is twofold: reviewing the current water 
allocation basin-wide in the Negotiation Committee, while in the meantime the Strategic 
Action Plan (SAP) is implemented in the form of joint projects in the NELSB and ENSB sub-
basin level (Cascao, 2009). Consensus creation over specific projects, like the RRFP, has 
become easier as a result of the technical and political dimensions being split (Jacobs, 2009). 
This step has weakened Egypt’s control tactics, especially over East Africa, as it falls into a 
different sub-basin from Egypt, Sudan and the upstream Blue Nile riparians. The institutional 
arrangement of the NBI has allowed East Africa to be part of the World Bank initiative 
legitimately and to develop its resources without having to take Egypt into account.
Apart from the NBI, the EAC has from its inception recognized the importance of joint 
negotiations on the Nile. In the EAC’s founding document,  the Treaty of Establishment of 
the EAC, Chapter 19 deals with the Cooperation in Environment and Natural Resource 
Management states that the goal of the treaty is “to jointly develop and adopt water resources 
conservation and management policies” (Article 111, Paragraph 2(b)). Although the EAC 
Partner States have stopped short of establishing a joint negotiation committee for Nile 
negotiations, the EAC Secretariat agreed “to push for our rights in the utilization of the Nile 
waters” (2002). The Partner States did not stop at verbal agreement on joint management as 
the cooperation strategy was confirmed in the Protocol for Sustainable Development of the 
Lake Victoria Basin (2003) which states that ‘the partner [EAC] states shall cooperate with 
other interested parties, regional or international bodies and programmes and in so doing, 
partner states shall negotiate as a bloc’ (EAC Secretariat, 2003), sentiments that have been 
confirmed in the Transboundary Environmental Assessment Guidelines for Shared 
Ecosystems in East Africa (2005) and the Protocol on Environmental and Natural Resources 
Management (2006). 
Therefore, the bottom-most block (light grey with black solid frames) in the above time scale
(Figure 3.2, page 62), represents those Protocols which have increased East Africa’s 
negotiation power. These are multilateral agreements between the Partner States that have 
changed the negotiation dynamics of water distribution on the Nile. This process has resulted 
in the CFA that has come out of the NBI’s Negotiation Committee and whose significance 
will be highlighted in the next section on legal capabilities in the Nile.
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3.4.3 Legal Capabilities
The discussion around the legality of the Nile water distribution, both on the international and 
basin level mirrors the ongoing discussion and legitimacy of upstream – downstream 
competition. Dagne et al. have argued that governments use legal principles to strengthen and 
justify their claims to the water (1999: 226). 
The two principles which dominate the discussion, and are directly opposed, are the acquired 
right doctrine and the absolute territorial sovereignty (also Harmon Doctrine) (Waterbury, 
2002). The acquired right to a transboundary watercourse is achieved through long-standing 
historical use and resulting dependencies on it. In effect, the first user has more rights to the 
water flow than the second user, though these terms are necessarily difficult to define. 
Opposed to this is the absolute territorial freedom to use resources on one’s territory as one 
pleases. In case of the NRB, Egypt is a strong proponent of the acquired doctrine, while 
upstream states have advocated their sovereign right to the water. Egypt’s historic right is 
based on two factors; its high dependency on the Nile for its survival and its long-standing 
legal claims.
This dynamic is made more complicated by the lack of a “binding international law on water 
utilisation” (Martinon, 2010: 56). The only attempt in this direction has been made by the 
UN. The 1997 Draft Convention was drawn up after 30 years of negotiations under the 
auspices of the International Law Commission (ILC) (Mohamoda, 2003). The Convention 
will become legally binding once 35 UN Member States have signed or ratified it; but as of 
the 1st of January 2012 only 26 states have done so, none of whom are Nile riparians 
(International Water Law Project website). For now, the 1997 Draft Convention remains a 
“conceptual tool for negotiations” (Waterbury, 2002: 28). 
Yet, in view of the fact that it is not legally binding, one may well question the usefulness of 
this conceptual tool for River Basin Organisations (RBO) which have to find concrete 
solutions. This has been one of largest controversies among researchers in international water 
law (Dagne et al., 1999; Hu, 2006; Okoth-Owiro, 2004; UNDP-GEP International Waters 
Project, 2011). Conca argues that the 1997 Draft Convention is the culmination of decades of 
regime creation in the global management of international river basins and that thus a degree 
of norm convergence has taken place (2006: 120). The 1997 Draft Convention attempts to 
reconcile the need for upstream states to utilise their water resources and equitable utilisation, 
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with guaranteeing downstream states future water supply and averting appreciable harm to 
the water flow. 
The 1997 Draft Convention might not be legally binding and norm convergence might not be 
as far along as Conca suggests, but for East Africa the emergence of the equitable utilisation
concept, in the late 1990s, has offered the opportunity to legitimately lay claim to the Nile 
water flow. Before the concept of equitable distribution emerged, laying claim to Nile water 
was equivalent to ‘stealing’ all the water from Egypt. But nowadays, claims can be supported 
by arguments in terms of the guidelines provided in the 1997 Draft Convention. The East 
African states’ disadvantage, however, has not entirely disappeared, as it will always be 
harder to prove that you use water equitably than to prove harm is being done to the water 
quality and quantity (Waterbury, 2002). 
By far the most controversial treaty on the Nile is the bilateral 1959 Agreement which forms 
the backbone of the hydropolitical dilemma in the Nile basin – downstream riparians want to 
maintain it while upstream riparians want to change it (Cascao, 2008: 245). The 1959 
Agreement is by no means the only treaty which disadvantages East Africa in terms of water 
flow allocation; eleven such treaties were signed between Great Britain and Egypt, Great 
Britain and Italy, Great Britain and Ethiopia, Great Britain and Independent Congo and Great 
Britain and Belgium in the years 1891 to 1952 (TFDD, 2011). Mohamoda concludes that all 
of these were based on the colonial aspirations of the British Empire (2003). Under the
Nyerere Doctrine which rejects “any categorization of international obligations which a 
successor state might have to accept or reject only because of the nature or type of the 
obligation” (Mekonnen, 2010: 434), the upstream states have rejected all agreements they did 
not negotiate as sovereign states. Undoubtedly, until today the 1959 Agreement is the most 
influential treaty regarding the utilisation of the Nile waters (Mohamoda, 2003).
According to the 1959 Agreement, Egypt is allocated the largest part of the water flow, 75%, 
Sudan 15%, and the remaining 10% is reserved for mean evaporation. Supporting Egyptian 
interests was a feature of earlier agreements such as the 1929 Agreement, which assigned 
Egypt 96% of the water flow. As was mentioned earlier, the 1959 Agreement also binds 
Sudan and Egypt together in negotiations under PJTC and grants Egypt the right to inspect 
and investigate any Nile projects for appreciable harm to its water flow. Apart from the 
blatantly unequal water distribution, whereby two states claim 100% of a transboundary
water flow for themselves, the 1959 Agreement leaves out provisions for protecting water 
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quality, or measures for flood control or environmental protection. Secondly, changing 
circumstances in the physical availability of water or political shifts in the riparian states are 
not mentioned (Brunnée & Toope, 2002). Both of these factors play a crucial part in the 
development and degradation of the Nile today and make renegotiation necessary (Brunnée &
Toope, 2002: 15), even if the water allocation were to remain the same.
Not surprisingly, there have been numerous attempts to renegotiate the 1959 Agreement and 
break the legal deadlock between upstream and downstream states. To that end, the NBI’s 
Negotiation Committee recommended the CFA which obliges all riparian states “not to cause 
significant harm to the water security of any other Nile basin countries” (Article 14(B) quoted 
in Yohannes, 2009: 76) and thus ignores the historic rights of previous users. If ratified, the 
CFA would establish a permanent river basin commission which could propose new water 
allocation mechanisms. Article 14(B) essentially amounts to a legally sanctioned 
redistribution and is the reason for Egypt’s and Sudan’s rejection of the CFA. The CFA has 
since been adopted by the six upstream riparians, all EAC Partner States and Ethiopia, the 
minimum states required for ratification. At the moment of writing, the CFA is still awaiting 
ratification by the national parliaments. It is noteworthy that the CFA represents the first 
alternative legal framework on the NRB brought forward by a coalition of upstream riparian 
states, despite Egypt’s explicit opposition. Even if the permanent river commission will not 
be established, the CFA symbolizes a growing East African confidence.
Undoubtedly, the legal regime in the NRB has played a crucial part in Egypt’s position as the 
hydro-hegemon. The British support, based on their colonial interests, has resulted in a highly 
skewed legal regime which does not just advantage Egypt but actually ignores any East 
African claim. The absence of a legally binding international convention has aided Egypt for 
years in insisting on its historic right. The 1959 Agreement particularly has attracted 
researchers’ and policy-makers’ attention – while Egyptian representatives consider it legally 
binding, East African states have rejected the 1959 Agreement since the 1960s. However, 
only the emergence of equitable utilisation in the 1990s has brought increased legitimacy to 
East African water claims. The concept of equitable utilisation gained further legal backing 
in the CFA which has been endorsed by all EAC Partner States. It has been argued that the 
CFA, although not yet ratified, is symbolic of the newfound East African confidence in the 
NRB. The new growth in confidence will be further discussed in the next section on the 
ideational capabilities of the riparians.
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3.5 Ideational Power
The intersubjective understanding that one actor is more powerful than another is as 
important as the material capabilities that underpin asymmetrical power relationships. It 
prevents actors from using other capabilities or challenging existing rules and principles. 
Although from a different time and setting, Steven Biko’s famous quote that “the most potent 
weapon of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed”, applies equally well to the NRB 
because all forms of hegemony rely on convincing other actors of their power, thus insuring 
the unquestioned continuance of the status quo. Ideas are the most effective way of exerting 
control and also the least tangible aspect of power (Cascao, 2008: 15). In this study it will be 
shown that the changing power balance between Egypt and East Africa is related to 
increasing knowledge and expertise about the transboundary water flow of the Nile.
3.5.1 Knowledge Capabilities
Egypt had been able to establish technical control over the Nile (see Section 3.3, page 54) 
partly because it was the only riparian that had the resources to study the Nile and create 
knowledge which it could utilise to its advantage. The example of the construction of the 
Owen Falls Dam illustrates the dependency of other Nile riparians on Egypt’s knowledge. 
Even today Egypt continues to have a permanent observer on site supervising the water levels 
(Waterbury, 2002: 159), meaning that this process is still ongoing.
The East African riparians have recognized the power in these mechanisms and have put 
pressure on Egypt to finance post-graduate diplomas on water resources under NBI auspices 
(Kagwanja, 2007: 328). The fact that the NBI Secretariat is based in Entebbe, Uganda is 
another important indicator that East Africa is advancing its experts and knowledge into the 
Nile governance regime.
Secondly, Egypt has for a long time managed to influence the ‘rules of the game’. For many 
years Egypt was the only riparian with national representation in Washington, increasing its 
visibility and making it the go-to state on Nile controversies. Egyptians headed the UN 
Environmental Directorate and the International Law Advisory position during the late 1980s 
and 1990s (Allan, 2000). Egypt also led crucial World Bank departments concerned with 
environmental and international law (Allan, 1999: 3; Allan, 2000). Concepts such as “The 
Nile is Egypt and Egypt is the Nile” shape the international normative understanding of the 
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Nile and Egypt as being interchangeable. The East African states are put in a position where 
any claims they make ‘take away’ from the Nile’s rightful owner. 
One might argue that these mechanisms are not a conscious exercise of power but rather the 
result of inaction on the part of the other riparian states and of unconscious decisions. 
However, Lukes points to the notion of responsibility towards both actions and non-actions as 
the determinant of power when he says that “the point, in other words, of locating power is to 
fix responsibility for consequences held from the action, or inaction, of certain specifiable 
agents” (1974: 56). Therefore, even if Egypt did not actively apply ideational power to 
strengthen its control, the fact remains that Egypt did nothing to stop strengthening it in this 
way either. This is the real determinant of power East Africa is in the position where is has to 
build up its knowledge capacity while Egypt merely has to defend the status quo. 
3.6 Closing the Gap
The question is for how much longer Egypt will find itself in the position to defend the status 
quo. For decades, as the discussions in this chapter showed, Egypt established and maintained 
hydro-hegemony. Through structural economic advantages, early technological advances, 
political strategizing, legal tools and greater knowledge capabilities, Egypt clearly established 
itself as the most powerful state in the NRB and has thus controlled the Nile flow. In 
addition, Egypt managed to contain upstream development projects by withholding the 
financial means necessary. Egypt used a variety of strategies and tactics – from coercive to 
cooperative − underpinned by its strong power indicators to control the Nile water flow.
Yet, in terms of all the indicators discussed here, East Africa is pushing to the fore. This 
chapter set out to establish whether East Africa has been gaining power according to the 
Hydro-hegemony framework. Through numerous examples and synchronic descriptions of 
the major developments in the NRB’s political dynamics since 2002, it has been shown that 
East Africa’s power is indeed increasing. The power gap between East Africa and Egypt is 
getting smaller. 
The chapter began by looking at the riparian position and dependency levels on the Nile. 
Across the White Nile, populations are growing and dependency on the Nile for drinking, 
sanitation, irrigation and electricity consumption purposes will increase, making the 
competition over the water ever fiercer between local communities as well as countries. 
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A discussion on the power indicators followed: i) material power, which is closely linked to 
exploitation potential, ii) institutional power and iii) ideational power. In terms of material 
power, the EAC Partner States have not yet caught up with Egypt. Egypt’s economic output 
continues to be by far the largest in the basin and its military is consequently larger and better 
equipped than that of the other states. However, it was argued that Egypt’s utilisation of the 
Nile water is inefficiently distributed by being highly skewed towards the agricultural sector. 
In the long run this diminishes Egypt’s ability to deal with diminishing water flows. 
East Africa faces serious economic challenges due to too little diversification, and poverty is 
intense and widespread. Nevertheless, regional economic organisations have increased their 
trade volume and economic growth is relatively high. This economic growth has also been a 
result of regional stability and has allowed the states to streamline their national armed 
forces. In terms of development, the supply of HEP is being pushed forward and long-
standing projects, like the RRFP, are now being realized. This increase in infrastructure 
development has been made possible by means of the investment of EXIM Bank of China 
and the NBI’s two-tier governance approach. Overall, the multilateral and joint approach of 
the East African countries has increased its economic output, electricity supply, and 
institutional negotiation power. 
As it is one of the most controversial issues in the NRB, a large part of the chapter focused on 
the legal dimension of the Nile water distribution. Egypt has long justified its almost 
exclusive access to the Nile through the 1929 and 1959 Agreements which are deeply rooted 
in British colonial aspirations. The emergence of equitable utilisation, coupled with the CFA, 
has increased East Africa’s legitimate access to the Nile since the 1990s. The Uganda-based 
NBI Secretariat, which stands for the increased knowledge capabilities East Africa is 
developing, has contributed to legitimising access to the Nile by the East African states.
In the following chapter, the consequences on Egypt’s hydro-hegemony will be analysed 
based on the finding in this chapter that East Africa is indeed closing the power gap 
compared to Egypt.
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CHAPTER 4: IMPACT ASSESSMENT
In the previous chapter, the context and dynamics of the White Nile were established in some 
detail. It was argued that East Africa is experiencing growth in relative power compared to 
Egypt, the hydro-hegemon. This chapter will begin by briefly returning to the counter-
hegemonic strategies that were introduced in Chapter 2 to expand on East Africa’s increased 
power and analyse the degrees of success each strategy has had on changing the power 
dynamics. This is followed up with the challenges that East Africa faces to become a united 
player at the source of the Nile, the Lake Victoria. 
East Africa’s and Egypt’s aim at consolidating control over the Nile begs the question: Why?.
Why are the riparian states putting so much effort into controlling a resource that is by nature 
uncontrollable? Securitization, the rhetorical process whereby an issue elevated above day-to-
day politics and made a matter of national security, of water and growing pressures of 
population growth plays a part in this process. One thing that also emerges from the discourse 
analysis is that due to the securitization of water, Egypt will try to maintain the status quo for
as long as possible.
This leads to the third part of the chapter which goes into the impact of successful counter-
hegemonic strategies for Egypt, thereby addressing the main research question. The answer to 
this question is divided into two categories, the impact on Egypt’s water flow and the impact 
on the Egyptian water resource control strategies. While the former is self-explanatory, if 
East Africa uses more water upstream, Egypt receives less downstream; the latter is more 
complex and rooted in this study’s theoretical framework. The LWRG’s Hydro-hegemony 
framework conceptualises power as underpinning water resource control strategies over 
transboundary watercourses (see Section 2.2.2, page 27). Since the power relations are 
changing, it will be argued that Egypt is adjusting its own water resource control strategies
accordingly, from being a coercive hydro-hegemon to a more cooperative stance with the aim 
of maintaining consolidated control.
The last part of this chapter looks tentatively at the future of the Nile and particularly at what 
would happen if Egypt’s hydro-hegemony collapses. This question is closely linked to the 
environmental decay along the NRB. It is argued that in the long run neither East Africa nor 
Egypt can be successful unilaterally in the face of rapid environmental decay and bleak 
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climate change forecasts. Benefit-sharing projects and genuine cooperation can secure the 
water resources for future generations and ecosystems.
4.1 Counter-hegemonic Strategies
This section provides a short summary of East Africa’s counter-hegemonic strategies against 
Egypt’s historic power position on the NRB, many of which were mentioned in the third 
chapter already. As was outlined in Chapter 2 on the Hydro-hegemony framework, Cascao 
(2008) describes these strategies in seven stages: i) reactive diplomacy, ii) active diplomacy, 
iii) cooperation, iv) mobilising international funding, v) the construction of expertise-based 
knowledge, vi) discourse alternatives, and vii) claim on legal principles. Having outlined the 
East African counter-hegemonic strategic successes, the second part of this section will 
address some of the challenges East Africa faces with regards to creating a stable multilateral 
counter hegemony.
4.1.1 Achievements
East Africa’s international diplomacy against Egypt’s hydro-imperialism was for a long time 
reserved to evocation of the Nyerere Doctrine. The Doctrine rejects any previous Nile 
allocation agreements since none of EAC Partner States took part in the negotiations as 
sovereign states. As recently as 2000, Allan reflected on the Nile 2002 Talks, stating that the 
Nile riparians questioned Egypt’s water rights but never put it onto the official agenda (2000: 
218). In 2002, for the first time the Kenyan and Ugandan parliamentarians discussed the 
legality of the 1929 Treaty and called for support from other East African governments for
their denunciation of it (Martinon, 2010: 56). The first phase of the counter-hegemonic 
strategy, international reactive diplomacy on the Nile reallocation, was kept at a low profile 
and proved to be unsuccessful to change the Nile water allocation. 
The emergence of the EAC and growing economic demands for the Nile water flow for HEP 
production has meant that the counter-hegemonic strategies moved into the second phase as 
criticism became more active. Based on the opinion of water experts, “regional instability [is] 
one of the main obstacles to cooperation and development” (El-Din Amer et al., 2005: 10). It 
is therefore not far-fetched, when Kagwanja asserts that the EAC builds the confidence and 
cooperation required to “vigorously assert their right to utilise the Nile waters” (2007: 326). 
Numerous multilateral agreements around the LVB, particularly the establishment of the 
LVBC in 2001 (see Figure 3.2 on the time scale of Treaties and Protocols pertaining to the 
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Nile River Basin, page 62) have served East Africa as a more successful strategic tool to lay 
active claim to the Nile water. 
Cooperation did not stop at the sub-basin level as the NBI granted East Africa the chance to 
widen its strategic impact, moving into the third phase of the counter-hegemonic strategy. 
The two-tier approach of the basin-wide NBI has allowed East Africa to increase its water 
utilisation by constructing projects within the NELSB which would have been previously 
unfeasible due to the asymmetrical power relations and financial constraints then existing.
Financially, the emergence of the PRC as a global actor in development projects has meant 
that East Africa could build large-scale hydro-infrastructure projects, like dams and 
transmission lines to its grids, which would have previously been obstructed by Egypt in the 
World Bank. The counter-hegemonic strategy to build up its own hydro-infrastructure 
projects by mobilising international funding has been very successful in terms of granting 
East Africa access to the Nile.
Section 3.5.1 (page 68) on knowledge capabilities portrayed East Africa’s growing expertise-
based knowledge. Postgraduate courses have been created and in December 2012, the Second 
East African Young Water Professional Conference will take place in Kigali, Rwanda, 
supported by governments and private companies who have recognized the importance of 
supporting the next generation of East African water managers. Cascao also points out that 
the NBI grants its member states the opportunity to take part in international conferences and 
shape the discussions and priorities that go into decision-making (2008: 25). If the new 
generation and the overall knowledge capabilities are improved this could prove to be an 
important aspect of East Africa’s counter-hegemonic strategy.
Knowledge capabilities essentially serve to legitimize the claim to the water and to create an 
alternative discourse on the status quo water distribution mechanism. The emergence of the 
equitable utilisation legal principle has allowed the upstream ‘discourse coalition’ between 
East Africa and Ethiopia to create increasing support for its claims in the media, at the 
national level, in official gatherings and among academics and technicians (Cascao, 2008: 
26). This researcher also found that despite Egypt’s historic right and high dependence on the 
Nile, most researchers and international media sources consider its hard-line position on the 
current Nile distribution untenable. For non-hegemons to have their side of the story heard 
and accepted is a major success in terms of counter-hegemonic strategising. 
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The final stage of the counter-hegemony strategy, according to Cascao (2008), is the claim to 
the transboundary watercourse based on legal principles. The CFA is the strongest counter-
hegemonic tactic and challenge to Egypt’s hydro-hegemony that the upstream discourse 
coalition has put forward. Considering that the CFA has not yet been ratified, its impact, once 
in place, remains to be seen. However, the creation of a permanent joint river commission 
which would have the power to legally re-allocate the Nile water flow is the ultimate 
expression of changing power relations and diminishing Egyptian hydro-hegemony.
Despite these successful multilateral counter-hegemonic strategies, one must be careful not to 
romanticize the degree of East African regional integration and cross-border cooperation, 
particularly on the local level.
4.1.2 Challenges
The large-scale cross-border projects that were described in Section 3.3 (page 54) on the East 
African exploitation potential, show that a large degree of trust is required, and apparently in 
place, between countries so that they will be able to share their electricity and river banks to 
create a win-win situation. For example, the RRFP in the Kagera River Basin is set to 
produce 60-70MW which is to be shared equally between the three riparian states, Burundi, 
Rwanda and Tanzania. On top of that, the three countries agreed in 2006 to jointly manage 
the dam (Rugumire-Makuza, n.d. b). However, even on the ‘exemplary’ RRFP project 
(RwandaEmbassy Sweden, 2012) the national compensation and resettlement policies vary 
greatly between countries, creating high tensions between the local communities on different 
sides of the fence (NBD, n.d.).
As a matter of fact, around the entire Great Lakes region, local cross-border resource ̶ and 
border disputes are common (Okumu, 2010). The Migingo Island dispute in 2009 
demonstrates that East Africa is still a long way from sharing resources multilaterally. The 
surface area of the island is about 2000m² and it has no notable resources, except for being 
located in an area with large amounts of Nile perch. The Island serves as transit and drying 
point for the fishing trade and a small and relatively wealthy community has established itself 
there. Due to the abovementioned creation of an artificial colonial border Uganda and Kenya 
are both in the position to claim the island as their own. Firstly, the island does not feature in 
any map from the 20th century and secondly, both countries were British territory, hence a 
dispute over a small rock seemed unlikely. Yet, in 2009, the two countries found themselves 
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at the brink of war over the fishing rights. These conflicts are often fuelled by the exclusion 
of parts the local population and end up in cross-border disputes (Okumu, 210: 281). 
Tensions over Lake Victoria has also feature at the state level. The three bordering countries, 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda dispute the causes of water levels dropping. Between 2004 and 
2005, the water levels in the Lake have been reduced by 1,5m (Okumu, 2010: 291; ARN, 
2011). Uganda alleges that these drops are due to climate change; however, Tanzania and 
Kenya mistrust these allegations and blame Uganda for over-draining at the Narubare and 
Kiira HEP plant to produce sufficient electricity and to supply Egypt with water. According 
to Okumu, the mistrust and allegations were fuelled by Uganda’s unilateral construction of 
the Kiira plant (2010: 291). Furthermore, “[t]he disputes in Lake Victoria are an illustration 
of the lack of regional arrangements over the sharing of trans-boundary natural resources 
(water and fish)” (2010: 292).
Although the role of the LVBC is to harmonize East African policies, the reality is that in 
many cases “unfortunately countries continue to prioritize self-sufficiency approach, which is 
untenable given the power needs of the region, currently and in the coming decade”, says 
Madame Rubomboras, the NBI Project Manager (quoted in Rugumire-Makuza, n.d.). 
Whether East Africa can become viable as a regional block and take on joint responsibility or 
will “disappointingly fizzle out” will be tested on Lake Victoria, which is “overfished and 
poisoned by the sewage running off its overpopulated shores” (The Economist, 2009). At the 
time of writing, Alam et al.’s argument that the riparian states simultaneously develop their 
‘own’ water resources and take part in international projects through the NBI (2011: 429) 
certainly seems to be valid. 
This implies that EAC Partner States might negotiate jointly with Egypt if it is in their 
respective interests since it increases their bargaining power. However, sharing resources like 
fisheries and water internally remains challenging. Rugumire-Makuza (n.d.) emphasises this 
difficulty, pointing out that the weak legal framework of cross-border projects, in the absence 
of a CFA, means that states can easily opt out of the Memorandum of Understandings that 
underpin these developments (n.d.). The opportunity that the PRC’s money has granted the 
respective governments has also increased the planning of unilateral projects, or at least 
increased the temptation since no restrictions are in place (Cascao, 2008). Yohannes contents 
that: “As it stands now, the state in the Nile basin is still regarded as the all-knowing sole 
authority over its domestic resources” (2009: 77).
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Whether unilaterally or multilaterally, East Africa wants to use more Nile water and is 
strategically working towards achieving its goal, affecting Egypt’s hydro-hegemony on the 
Nile. The next section will look more closely at the reason behind East Africa’s and Egypt’s 
strategizing, namely the securitization of water.
4.2 Securitization of Water
The question arises why it is important for the riparians to achieve consolidated control even 
if it harms them in the long run not to agree to basin-wide projects. Alam and colleagues 
explain: 
An uncertain water supply is problematic for two reasons. First, because of the 
role water plays in socio-ecological systems means uncertain availability can 
have large social, political, ecological and ﬁnancial consequences. Second, the 
need for water is increasing just as governments’ ability to meet demand is 
decreasing. (...) Most governments seek to minimise the uncertainty by exerting 
control over hydrological ﬂows. (2011: 426)
One way that governments and the public in their domestic setting think about these 
uncertainties has been to rhetorically construct water as an existential threat. This process is 
also called securitization (Buzan et al., 1998). Particularly Egypt has securitized the Nile.
This process of securitization of the Nile water flow emerged under British imperial control 
which is illustrated by the Fashoda Crisis between France and Great Britain. Prompted by a 
hydraulic engineer at the Egyptian Institute in Paris who suggested the Nile water flow could 
be dammed in the upper Nile, the French sent troops to Fashoda (now in Sudan) in 1898 as a 
preliminary to possibly building a dam there (Layne, 1994: 6). Over the decades many such 
projects have been planned but as yet humans have not managed to subjugate the forces of 
the Nile water. Back in 1989, the British government and public opinion perceived one 
French battalion in Sudan (without any technical equipment to build a dam) as such a threat 
to their position on the Nile, and the water flow itself, that they marched into Sudan the same 
year and confronted the French (Layne, 1994: 6). Due to a fragile domestic political situation 
and a weaker military might than Britain, France was forced to retreat and leave the upper 
Nile in the control of imperial Britain (Layne, 1994: 7). This incident gave rise to a number 
of secret treaties assuring Great Britain that the Nile flow would continue uninterrupted. The 
example illustrates the amount of resources Great Britain poured into securing the Nile water 
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flow, even against miniscule threats. Egypt has taken on the same securitization rhetoric – the 
Nile is existential to Egypt’s survival.
Egypt is often portrayed as the only country which has acquired the right to the Nile water 
over thousands of years. The often repeated statement by the Greek historian Herodotus 
“Egypt is the gift of the Nile” (460 BC) adds to this general perception. However, this does 
not reflect archaeological findings, which show that people upstream as well as downstream, 
have used the water for irrigation purposes as long as people have settled there. The Nile 
banks have provided the richest resources to arid regions and some of the oldest artefacts in 
Africa can be found in the riverbanks. At the same time, the populations were much smaller 
and life was shaped by resource availability, not resources moulded to fit the demand. This 
equilibrium was revolutionised by industrialisation which is why the British colonial era still 
shapes historical claims in the region today. 
While the securitization rhetoric has been of long standing in Egypt, it is relatively new to 
East Africa. However, increasing populations demand for HEP to grow economically, and 
decreased water quality and quantity have led to securitization across the basin. Headlines 
such as “Upstream states should strike while Egypt’s in turmoil” reflect the growing 
discontent in East Africa (2011) over the current water distribution. This researcher also 
argues that the recurring academic debate on Water Wars and the conflict potential of water 
sharing has not aided the process of de-securitization of the Nile, but the reverse. 
Securitization is problematic for several reasons. Securitized resources allow for 
extraordinary measures, like threats to use violence (see Section 4.4, page 80), escalating 
conflictual relationships faster. Furthermore, ideological compliance shapes the perception of 
the transboundary water resource, since often the notion of ‘us’ and ‘them’ gets invoked 
(based on Buzan & Weaver, 2003), making the necessary basin-wide agreements harder to 
negotiate. 
To synthesise these arguments, the way the Nile has been securitized in domestic discussions 
across the basin has led to a situation where competition and the aim of controlling the Nile 
water flow has become even more important than it was previously. Furthermore, the Nile is 
not the only river where securitization of water resources is increasingly shaping policy and 
investment decisions. The consequences of this global securitization will be looked at in the 
following section.
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4.3 Impact on Egypt’s Water Flow
The obvious impact of East Africa’s increasing power over the Nile is that more water will be 
used upstream and less will arrive downstream, as the long-term consequence of the power 
shift means that the EAC Partner States will utilise more of the water flow themselves. The 
construction of three HEP plants near Jinja, Uganda alone: Narubare, Kiira and Bujagali, 
show the acceleration of HEP production in the upstream White Nile countries. The water 
used to produce HEP can largely be re-used further downstream once it has been through the 
turbines. However, water used in irrigation for the agricultural sector cannot be reused. It is 
therefore the second feature of dams, their storage capacity, that makes them politically 
controversial. Although governments have argued that their escalating populations require 
them to increase food production, there is evidence to the effect that neither upstream nor 
downstream populations are on the receiving end of increased agricultural production.
International privately owned companies, often with the back of their home governments, buy 
or lease land in sub-Saharan Africa on a grand scale, also referred to as land grabbing or land 
acquisition. The resulting large-scale agricultural activities often deprive local populations of 
sufficient water when water flows are diverted to meet the companies’ needs, since in 
practice the companies have no water restrictions placed on them (Cotula et al., 2009;
Herman, 2011). The 2012 Global Hunger Index has warned that Burundi already has 
alarming levels of hunger due to unsustainable use of land, water and energy (“Burundi: 
Report Warns Land, Water Pressure to Cause Hunger”, 2012). Local activists have started to 
call the process of buying land and using water uninhibitedly ‘water grabbing’ (Herman, 
2011). The situation is especially precarious as the FAO estimates that a maximum of 8 
million hectares irrigated land can be sustained at current levels of Nile water flow
(Appelgren et al., 2000). Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia are already irrigating about 
5,4 million hectares and have leased out another 8 million hectares over the last few years
(“Burundi: Report Warns Land, Water Pressure to Cause Hunger”, 2012). The NGOs that 
compiled the 2012 Global Hunger Index explain that the political will to implement 
sustainable solutions to distribute the water equitably, frankly, seems absent:
Food security is threatened by governments’ focus on short-term economic gains; 
uncoordinated land, water and energy policies; and lack of political willingness 
and action to design policies that increase efficiency and reduce waste of natural 
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resources while protecting the poor. (“Burundi: Report Warns Land, Water 
Pressure to Cause Hunger”, 2012)
According to a report by Lorenzo Cotula and his colleagues (2009), international land 
acquisition is driven by three processes; i) increased food prices makes land acquisition in 
low rent countries a profitable business, ii) the demand for biofuels, especially in Europe, is 
increasing, and iii) food insecurity in countries with high populations, like Kuwait and India, 
has driven these countries towards producing food in Africa and shipping it home to meet 
their domestic market demand. In all three cases, the local populations along the NRB are 
losing out; they are not on the receiving end of the agricultural production, the land and water 
needed to meet their own food production is increasingly becoming scarce and no cross-
border analysis of the impacts of land acquisition has been performed to date (KH, 2012).
Although the impact of upstream projects in the NRB on Egypt’s future water supply is the 
driver behind the conflicts and disagreements between countries in the NRB, within the 
framework of this study, upstream infrastructural development is a metaphor for the impact 
of East African claims on the Nile and Egyptian hydro-hegemony. After all, the NELSB 
contributes only 14% to Egypt’s water flow since the largest part of the White Nile 
evaporates in the Sudd Swamps in South Sudan. Moreover, Egypt is less dependent on the 
Nile for its food security than it used to be; the agricultural sector contributes 40% less to the 
GDP now than it did half a century ago (Selby, 2005: 13). At the same time the import of 
water-heavy commodities, or Virtual Water, has increased significantly and supplemented the 
Egyptian agricultural sector, further decreasing Egypt’s dependence on the Nile water flow 
(Cascao, 2008).
What is being discussed in this study is Egypt’s hydro-hegemonic position. In other words, 
not the volume of water flow Egypt actually receives but its ability to control East Africa 
from refraining to use the transboundary watercourse. Therefore, what matters is not whether 
or not water used in dams can be ‘recycled’ but that Egypt can no longer stop East Africa 
building hydrological infrastructure in the first place, whomever they serve. That is the 
indicator of diminishing Egyptian hydro-hegemony. 
As was explained in Chapter 2, the hydro-hegemon uses all available water resource control 
strategies to underpin its hydropolitical position. As Gramsci noted and neo-Gramscians have 
since expanded on, hegemony derives its power from a combination of coercive and non-
coercive strategies. The next section will look at how Egypt has moved from being a coercive 
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hydro-hegemon to using cooperative strategies to maintain the status quo as the other 
riparians are becoming more powerful.
4.4 Impact on Egypt’s Water Resource Control Strategies
As the Nile’s water flow will decrease through increased upstream usage or climate change, 
respectively, Egypt has two choices for compensating; through technical innovation or 
political manoeuvring. The technical solution would mean the diversification of Egypt’s 
water sources, for example by pumping its very limited groundwater resources to the surface, 
a short-term approach at best, or through desalination. As a matter of fact, the tourist resorts 
in Sharm El Sheikh already receive their freshwater supply through desalination. Yet building 
and operating desalination plants is not only expensive, $393.8 million per year for Egypt in 
2010 alone (GWI, 2010), but also environmentally harmful by releasing chemical discharge 
back into the oceans (Lattemann & Höpner, 2008), eventually poisoning the source of the 
water. 
A more long-term approach would require a change in policy on the domestic and foreign 
water distribution policy front. Domestically, Egypt could increase the efficiency of water 
utilization through more stringent regulation of the agricultural sector. This could be done, 
for example, through capping the maximum usage of each sector as is done in one of the 
world’s most populated basins, the Pearl River Basin in China (EC JRC Workshop, 2012). 
Alternatively, benefit-sharing or win-win projects across the river basin would require a 
foreign policy shift. When riparian states jointly invest in the most efficient project and 
allocate the benefits basin-wide the result is generally referred to as a win-win situation
(Scheumann et al, 2008: 27). Already there are signs that this is happening. On the website of 
the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation the Ministry claims that its aim is to 
“[i]ncrease Egypt’s share from the Nile water by cooperation and coordination with the Nile 
basin countries to establish joint projects to polarize and make use of the lost water”.
In the past, Egypt has used its relatively larger power to coerce other riparians to comply with 
the highly uneven water distribution. A few coercive tactics have been mentioned above. The 
stalling of financial payments for upstream projects in the World Bank is exemplary of 
Egypt’s coercive behaviour. Even more so, is threatening to use violent means to ensure the 
continued water flow. 
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There is a pattern of statements by various Egyptian Presidents stressing the possibility of 
using violent means to control the Nile water flow. In 1979, a statement by the Egyptian 
President, Anwar Sadat that “the only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water” 
(quoted in Mohamoda, 2003: 9) reflect the discourse of securitization (Section 4.2, page 76). 
Over the decades this rhetoric has continuously been repeated by high-ranking Egyptian 
government officials. In response to the signing of the CFA, the former Egyptian 
Parliamentary Affairs Minister Mufid Shehab said that the government considered the issue 
of Nile water a matter of "life and death" (quoted in Egypt Independent, 2010). How the post-
revolutionary Egyptian government handles the Nile remains to be seen; however, there is 
little doubt that Egypt will continue to see the Nile as fundamental to its water security. 
Several authors have mentioned a Wikileaks document from September 2012 which claims 
that Sudan agreed to host an Egyptian airbase in the Darfur region to defend the Nile flow, if 
necessary, through military means or sabotage (Collins, 2012; Tadesse, 2012). Yet, instead of 
Egypt voicing this possibility out loud as was done previously, the intention represented in 
this leaked document was not meant as a public statement and a few days later the Egyptian 
government vehemently denied the allegations (“Egypt: Government denies deal with 
Sudan”, 2012). 
These threats are also a long way from erupting into a Water War. Some degree of conflict, 
as the SWH points out, may indeed not be negative (2004). It can serve as a catalyst in 
society for new ideas and compromise if there is a legitimate forum in which conflicts are 
negotiated. Legal systems and democratic institutions are examples of institutions which 
translate conflicts into peaceful processes (SWH, 2004). Only when these systems do not 
exist or do not work can “conflicts become detrimental for large groups in the affected 
societies” (SWH, 2004: 2). In this regard, the NBI translates conflictual views over the Nile 
into compromise, as a special committee is now doing with the Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia 
(Water21, 2012). Egypt’s joining the NBI in 1999 despite the World Bank’s sub-basin 
approach to project funding is one example of its changed strategy; staying in the NBI, 
despite the CFA, has illustrated Egypt’s commitment to the institutional approach. Despite 
the political pressures, the NBI seems stable and Egypt continues to turn up at meetings 
despite its threats to the contrary.
Over the last decade, Egypt’s foreign policy has taken a more cooperative tone towards 
benefit-sharing projects. In addition to taking part in the NBI negotiations, Egypt has 
announced large-scale upstream investment projects to increase efficient water utilization (El-
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Din Amer, 2005: 8; Mungai, 2011). At the beginning of 2012, at the 13th Nile Day, celebrated 
at Jinja, Uganda, the Head of the Egyptian delegation, Hisham Qandil, said that Egypt 
imports US$6 billion per annum of foods, and that it wants to import increasingly from 
upstream Nile riparians (Egypt SIS, 2012). Egypt has also unveiled plans to invest US$5 
billion in upstream electricity grids to increase their performance (Naswari, 2010). This kind 
of investment has the potential to create benefit-sharing or win-win solutions. At the same 
time, this kind of investment reasserts Egypt’s hydro-hegemony, instead of using coercive 
strategies; Egypt positively reinforces alternative uses of the Nile. 
What emerges from the description of the current situation is a picture of a region in flux. 
East Africa’s potential to change the hydropolitical situation in the NRB is large, also due to 
its upstream position. However, it remains to be seen if the EAC Partner States can work 
together to create a stable regime because as individual states they are too weak to do so. 
Egypt seems to be adapting its strategies to remain in control of the water flow, taking part in 
NBI negotiations and investing in upstream projects, thus potentially creating win-win 
projects under its leadership. But what the future holds for the NRB is open to speculation. 
4.5 The Future?
The final sections of this study attempt to tentatively look at the future of the White Nile, 
politically and environmentally. If East Africa, together with Ethiopia, its discourse partner, 
manages to unhinge Egyptian hydro-hegemony, this might not necessarily be a positive
development. The consequences of regime change, i.e. in this case, the end of Egyptian 
hydro-hegemony, are a matter of controversy in IR theory and once again reflect the 
irreconcilable positivist / post-positivist views. In IR literature the consequences of a change 
in power relations, which has mostly been analyzed on the world system level, can be broadly 
categorized into two camps. Realists and neorealists predict the breakdown of order and 
peace as hegemony declines, while constructivists argue that new regime creation is difficult 
but does not necessarily lead to war.
Robert Cox has argued that a change in hegemony can have three outcomes (1987), all of 
which could be applied to the NRB. The first possible outcome is the strengthening of 
hegemony with partners. In the case of Egypt, Sudan has been a stable partner, in spite of 
occasional diplomatic disagreements (Saleh, 2008) and is also legally bound to Egypt through 
the PJTC. Although this does not necessarily mean that Egypt must continue to receive the 
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55bcm of the 1959 Agreement, Egypt could maintain control by compromising on the 
volume to increase its ideational power through increased legitimacy. 
The second outcome is that a non-hegemonic order emerges, with different power centres 
held together by trade. The trade of Virtual Water in the basin is likely to increase, also 
through the Egyptian investment and land acquisition which were mentioned in the previous 
section. At the same time, the trade in HEP has been increasing and more cross-border power 
cables are being installed by the NELSAP. 
The third possible outcome is that the counter-hegemon establishes a new regime. At the 
moment, East Africa does not seem strong enough, materially or in terms of stability, to take 
on that role. However, its potential as a region and upstream riparian to challenge Egypt in 
the future is there. The EAC’s commitment to “Deepening and Accelerating Integration” 
(EAC, 2011a) and increasing continental market integration through the COMESA-EAC-
SADC Tripartite, could push its material power over the next years. It will take careful 
planning and political commitment by the respective governments to alleviate poverty and 
overcome the political and social challenges that have plagued the region for decades.
In the end, one cannot predict the outcome of the power struggle in the NRB but one thing is 
for sure; the stress on the water resource is already immense and is likely to get worse in the 
future, due to basin-wide environmental decay. Whoever will be in power on the Nile banks
in the future has to address the issues of environmental decay together with all stakeholders 
in the basin.
4.6 Environmental Decay
The year 2013 is the 10 year anniversary of the Protocol of the Sustainable Development of 
the Lake Victoria Basin and a good time to reflect on the environmental state of the Nile. 
Overall, it is not looking good and is set to get worse. In addition to population growth and 
increased waste, other human activities are putting pressure on the quantity and quality of the 
Nile, destroying the ecosystems and source of freshwater for future generations.
On Lake Victoria, environmental groups warn of falling water levels. According to the 
African Rivers Network (ARN), the Ugandan government is currently considering releasing 
more water to increase power production and meet its demand (2011). This would reverse the 
slow recovery of the Lake’s ecosystem, maybe irreversibly so, after the water hyacinth 
invasion in the mid-1990s (UNEP, 2010: 83) The water hyacinths were so widespread that 
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local fishing boats could no longer launch their boats, seriously impacting the fish stock and 
local income. Through coordinated effort by the riparians under the auspices of the LVBC the 
hyacinths have disappeared but are now once again on the rise (UNEP, 2010: 84). Surface 
runoff from the Entebbe area, in Uganda, shows up as greenish clouds expanding into the 
Lake. Agricultural runoff and domestic waste runs straight into Lake Victoria unfiltered, 
further degrading water quality and causing the bloom of the hyacinths (UNEP, 2010: 83). 
In Section 3.2.1 (page 49) the importance of the fishing industry to the region was described, 
particularly in relation to the Nile perch which was artificially introduced in 1954 and whose 
population exploded in the 1970s. This led to the explosion of fishery as a source of income 
in Lake Victoria in the 1980s. As a result, the fish stocks in the Lake have been decreasing 
since (EfD, 2008). As other sources of income are scarce, the number of fisherfolk grew by 
52% from 2000-2006 (LVFO, 2012) and fisherfolk go further onto the lake with increasing 
motorization. In order to protect the species it has been suggested that fishing be prohibited 
within 200 metres of the shore but nothing has been done to implement this suggestion 
(LVFO, 2012). 
All along the Nile, large dams and flooding of land reservoirs, loss of biodiversity, invasive 
weeds, and increased pollution by unaccountable private companies, is having a considerable 
impact on the local ecosystems, which impact will get worse (Okurut, 2011). According to 
Okbazghi Yohannes desertification and the extension of the Sahelian belt is accelerating
(2009: 74). Rainfall has decreased by 15% between 1956 and 1985. Due to the damming in 
Egypt only 2% of the water flow reaches the Mediterranean Sea (Brunnée & Toope, 2002: 9) 
which has severe impacts as the river’s mouth is sinking and eroding the river bed 
(Bohannon, 2010). This is due to the fact that deposits of soil no longer offset the natural 
effect of soil compaction. Once soil begins to fall away it accelerates erosion. Due to the high 
levels of evaporation in the desert areas, Lake Nassar has severely increased soil salinity 
levels. Pollution is so severe that Egypt has been classified as Water-Scarce Hotspot in the 4th
UNESCO World Water Development Report which states that “the main challenge to the 
sustainability of Egypt’s water resources is water pollution” (2012: 15)
The future of resource availability is hard to predict, especially as climate change is set to 
have severe consequences on the region. However, a survey by the OECD modelled the 
likely outcomes of climate change for the Nile. Temperatures are likely to rise across the 
region which means demand for water will rise, even if the population size remains stable 
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(Agrawala et al., 2004: 13). According to the researchers, rainfall will become more seasonal 
which means floods during the winter months and droughts in the summer (Agrawala et al., 
2004: 13). Both extremes would lead to dislocation and aggravated food insecurity 
(Yohannes, 2009: 83). Ironically, dams are often described as adaptive capacities to meet 
future climate change challenges but the opposite is true. As more HEP dams are being built, 
the Nile’s adaptive capacity in response to climate change is actually decreasing because the 
dams’ water storage reservoirs increase evaporation rates. Also, the dams are not planned for 
the large floods that are likely to arrive with climate change, and pose a risk to the entire 
basin’s population when they burst (Beilfuss, 2012). This argument leads Alam et al. to ask 
whether 
a technical solution, such as physical infrastructure, can answer the complex 
social, ecological, ﬁnancial, and political problem of ensuring a reliable water 
supply? (2011: 428).
Neither the acquired right position, nor absolute sovereignty takes environmental protection 
into account sufficiently. Even the 1997 Draft Convention focuses too little on conservation 
and concentrates too heavily on economic development (Waterbury, 2002). Outside the 
power political realm, the bleak forecast for the Nile’s quality and quantity requires
comprehensive cooperation of all riparians, whether under Egyptian leadership or otherwise. 
4.7 Changing Hydropolitical Positions
The fourth chapter of the study on the impacts of East Africa’s increasing power on Egypt’s 
hydro-hegemony on the Nile started by analysing the counter-hegemonic strategies East 
Africa has utilised to change the current asymmetrical power relationship and resulting 
uneven water distribution. The seven counter-hegemonic strategies, taken together, proved to 
be successful in challenging Egypt and claiming Nile water. The mobilisation of Chinese 
money to construct dams and the CFA especially, have been very successful counter-
hegemonic strategies. However, East Africa is also facing some internal challenges over 
shared governance of Lake Victoria. Mistrust over water levels and Uganda’s relationship 
with Egypt, as well as localised conflict over fish stocks have been very contentious. 
Internally unilateral projects and uncoordinated policies lead to tensions, while externally 
multilateral negotiations seem to be the norm.
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This discussion on East Africa’s successes and challenges on the Nile was followed by the 
analysis of the securitization of water which dominates the domestic discourses. The 
securitization of the Nile in form of threats and uncompromising negotiation positions, even 
if irrational, makes basin-wide agreements more difficult. The existential fear of losing the 
Nile and its water for survival also explains why riparians strive to increase their power on 
the transboundary watercourse. 
The Nile riparians are not alone in their fears over food security. International investors have 
been buying or leasing land in the NRB area on a massive scale to meet their domestic 
demand, decreasing water availability for the local populations upstream and downstream. 
Whether through dams, increased irrigation schemes or climate change, Egypt is set to 
receive less water in the next decades than previously, and is no longer in the position to 
obstruct upstream riparians from utilising the water. Egypt’s poewr is decreasing but it is 
adjusting its water resource control strategies. In the past, Egypt has used coercive means, 
like threats, to hinder upstream hydro-infrastructure projects. It seems as though the Egyptian 
government today rather invests in alternative water usage, more efficient utilisation and the 
trade in Virtual Water. Nevertheless, the newly elected Egyptian government, like the one 
before it, has made the Nile a priority and is likely to protect its interests where it can.
This assessment has led to an analysis of three scenarios of what the future of the Nile could 
look like in terms of power politics. Either, things remain the same and Egypt can maintain 
consolidated control with Sudan as a partner, or trade in Virtual Water and HEP will bind the 
riparians so closely that it diminishes other power indicators and a multipolar regime 
emerges. The final option would consist of new regime formation by upstream riparians, 
although this would most of all require East Africa to overcome its own challenges.
Regardless of who will be more powerful in the future, a basin-wide approach to the looming 
environmental crisis is urgently needed as water quality and quantity are under stress owing 
to detrimental human activities.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
5.1 Summary of Findings
This study has utilised the Hydro-hegemony framework to investigate the consequences of 
East Africa’s increasing power on Egypt’s hydro-hegemony in the NRB. This chapter will 
revisit the findings generated in each of the previous chapters, before examining potential 
topics and directions for future research. The chapter will then proceed to tentatively
generalise the findings to other African transboundary river basins.
Chapter 2 attempted to provide an overview of the discussions that have framed the 
hydropolitical discussion in IR. It emerged that while there has been much emphasis on 
Water Wars (Starr, 1991) little research has been done into asymmetrical power relations 
between riparian states. The Hydro-hegemony framework by Zeitoun and Warner (2006) has 
brought together scales of conflict and power indicators at the basin level. In addition, Ana 
Cascao, also from the LWRG, developed a framework to analyse counter-strategies of non-
hegemons. 
The LWRG’s Hydro-hegemony framework, it was argued, falls prey to the territorial trap and 
the state-centric approach is insufficient to cover East African hydropolitics. Based on East 
Africa’s approaches to historic, political, economic and resource governance issues, it was 
proposed in this study that a regional analysis is more apt. The argument was advanced that 
the conceptualisation of relative power, water resource control strategies, and intensities of 
conflict can also be applied at the regional level. 
Chapter 3 proceeded to establish the asymmetrical power relationship that has prevailed in 
the NRB, represented in terms of the three pillars of hydro-hegemony which have over 
decades supported Egypt’s hydro-hegemony, as well as the growing power that East Africa is 
carving out. In terms of material power, Egypt continues to be the most powerful actor in the 
basin, although opening up regional economic markets has brought with it considerable 
growth in East Africa. In the other aspects – the technical, financial and legal, as well as in 
institutional settings – East Africa has been catching up with Egypt over the past decade. 
From the arguments in the third chapter it was concluded that East Africa is indeed 
challenging Egypt’s hydro-hegemony in the NRB.
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Based on this finding, Chapter 4 went on to highlight the impacts of East Africa’s power 
challenge on Egypt. Although Egypt used to be able to stop dams being built they are now 
effectively powerless in this regard. Where in the past Egypt controlled the legal debate in the 
NRB, the multilateral CFA has forced Egypt to consider how to secure its access to the Nile 
water legally. The response of Egypt to these developments has been a change from coercive 
to cooperative strategies to maintain the status quo. Whether this change of strategy can 
actually maintain Egypt’s hydropolitical position remains to be seen. It seems relatively sure 
though that due to environmental and human pressures, East Africa and Egypt will be forced 
to cooperate in the future and plan for a future time with less, and lower quality water. The 
findings in Chapter 4 reveal that unless the riparian states cooperate to utilise the finite water 
more efficiently, it will become a lose-lose situation for everyone. 
5.2 Recommendations for Future Research
The recommendations made in this section are to a large degree based on the limitations that 
have framed this study, outlined in Chapter 1. There were some aspects that had to be 
excluded due to the time frame and scope of analysis, but in future research projects these 
aspects could lead to a greater understanding of the subject matter. 
First, the time frame available to complete this study was limited to one year. A long-term 
study over the next decade might highlight alternative trends. Considering the political and 
hydrological volatility of East Africa and Egypt, the power relations could shift considerably 
over the coming decade. On one hand, the chances of the DRC erupting into another civil war 
which once again consumes the whole region is not negligible, even after years of the largest 
UN peacekeeping mission, as reports of mass rapes and threats to East Africa’s regional 
security repeatedly feature in the international news. The neighbouring conflict hotspot, 
South Sudan, also poses a variety of threats to the region. Refugee flows and cross-border 
raids have emanated from this, the newest sovereign state. Local resource conflicts between 
refugees, pastoralists and farmers have attracted some researchers’ attention (SWH, 2004), 
but there had been little attention to linking these to the larger basin-wide pressure on water 
resources.
At the regional level, political disagreements have once before led to the collapse of the first 
East African Community, in 1977, and there is no guarantee that this time the EAC is more 
stable. Though power differences between the EAC Partner States were largely left out of the 
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analysis, a future analysis of the NELSB power configurations could give further indications
of whom the water will flow towards – especially if private industry is taken into account. On 
the topic of ‘water flowing to money’, the EXIM Bank of China and the World Bank have 
emerged as actors in their own right in the international sphere, especially as their political 
negotiation become increasingly important in transboundary river basins (Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, Sweden, 2001: 8; ARN, 2011). Within the narrow scope of this analysis, 
these new actors in hydropolitics have not been addressed. The influence and agency of these 
internal and external actors could serve as platforms for further research. In this regards, it 
could be interesting to research to what degree the EAC is actually coordinating their water 
policies since, on the ground, anyone can dig a hole and start watering their field if no 
implementation mechanisms are in place.
The recent events in Egypt have added to the impression that political stability, previously a 
cornerstone of Egyptian hydro-hegemony, is not as stable as it used to be. The newly elected 
Egyptian leadership might make both tactical and strategic foreign policy changes, affecting 
the type of strategy over the water resources. The focus of this study was fundamentally on 
the East African perspective and it was beyond the scope of the study to look in-depth at the 
consequences of domestic Egyptian power changes, an interesting aspect for future studies.
Most unpredictably, the consequences of climate change have the power to shift the very 
basic geographical indicators taken for granted in this study. As an external and more 
powerful actor than both East Africa and Egypt, it could plunge both ends of the Nile into a 
severe water crisis, making cooperation a necessity and putting asymmetrical power aside as 
emergency measures will have to be implemented.
The players that have not been mentioned, their development and larger global developments 
affect the power constellation and water availability in the NRB and are thus recommended 
for future research. The above discussion can be used as a starting point to understand 
changing processes. Only if we understand the processes and agents involved in water 
distribution can we hope to achieve a sustainable and equitable regime. It is the responsibility 
of IR students to take part in this critical process, keeping in mind that water is life.
Finally, in the first chapter it was argued that case studies can provide generalisations to 
similar settings and indeed this is one of the methodological merits. The detailed analysis of 
one specific setting provides high internal validity which can then be transferred to the 
population. As Africa’s transboundary river basins cover 65% of the total area, 78% of the 
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people and 93% of the surface water (Ashton, 2009), it is suggested that the current study 
may lend itself to interesting comparative studies on other African transboundary river basins 
in the future, focusing on the common challenges and different solutions to them. At this 
point in history, governments in riparian countries across Africa should agree that 
negotiations are the only way transboundary basins can go forward to prepare for climate and 
water flow variations.
In short, the answer to Laswell’s question Who gets how much water and why? (1935) is that 
Egypt utilises most of the water and maintains its hydro-hegemony through its relatively 
larger power and water resource control strategies. However, the NRB is a region in flux and 
East Africa has been challenging Egypt on numerous levels and is successfully claiming 
more water itself. The impact of that change in power relations on Egypt, could, however, be 
dwarfed by the looming environmental crisis on the Nile.
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